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This dissertation measured using appropriate methodology the degree of independence of
the Reserve Bank of Malawi based on the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act of 1989.
Furthermore the dissertation assessed the vulnerability of this independence in the
context of good governance and a variety of internal and external threats on the
independence. This comes from the understanding that even though central banks are
accorded independence, there are situations where practice deviates from what the
charters state. Therefore the dissertation provides recommendations on how to strengthen
the Reserve Bank Act to support its legal independence.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Independence of Central Banks has generated considerable debate since the 1990s for several
reasons. The most cited reason by economists is that in a highly globalised world economy and
with intensified competition for capital and finance, politicians tend to use Central Bank's
independence to signal their country's credit worthiness (Maxfield, 1997: 11; Padayachee,
2001 :745). Both Padayachee and Maxfield point out that this derives from the belief among agents
in financial markets that the government on its own cannot be trusted with effective and non-
partisan implementation of monetary policy. In many instances, it is argued that the independent
pursuit of monetary policy tends to be compromised by political interests and populist pressures.
Therefore autonomy and independence of the Central Bank is vital for monetary policy
effectiveness and credibility (Maxfield, 1997:4, 11; Maliszewski, 2000:1; Padayachee, 2001:747;
Lybek, 2004:2).
Even though much of the debate has been directed towards independence, inflation rates and
recently inflation targeting, issues of governance and accountability have started to take centre
stage (Padayachee, 2001:747; Lybek, 2004:8). In the 1990s Central Banks began to compare their
internal governance arrangements amongst themselves through groups such as the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) or bilaterally (Koch, 2007: 1). According to Koch, external
pressures emanating from other public sector agencies, private sector firms, international
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the public at large have all played
a part in pushing Central Banks towards better governance, improved accountability and
transparency. Most economists believe that issues of independence, accountability and governance
far from being opposed to one another are rather complementary. The better the governance and
accountability, the more likely it will be that the Central Bank's goals, policies and independence
will be understood and defended (Eijffinger & Hoeberichts, 2000:1-2; Lybek 2004:2-3; Quintyn,
2007:n.p.). Research in Malawi has been directed towards Central Bank independence and
inflation rates, and regimes (Sinoya, 2001 ;Simwaka 2004); very little has been done on
transparency and accountability. While some researchers (Eijffinger and Hoeberichts, 2000; Lybek
2004) have studied issues of good governance, accountability and transparency in developed
countries, there are no such studies on Malawi.
1
This research attempts to fill that gap by looking at the issues of governance in the Reserve Bank
of Malawi in relation to the independence accorded to it by the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act of
1989. The study will also advise the revision process of the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act which is
in the pipeline.
1.1. Objectives and Methodology
The project had two main objectives:
1. To measure, using appropriate methodology, the degree of independence of the Reserve
Bank of Malawi based on the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act of 1989.
11. To assess the vulnerability of this independence in the context of good governance and the
variety of threats on the independence.
To achieve the objectives, the project used measures of Central Bank independence developed by
Cukierman, A., Web, S., and Neyapti, B. (1994) (see annex 1 page 59). This measure is based on
the coding of the Central Bank charter and may be termed the Legal Independence Measure since
it is based on the degree of independence conferred on the Central Bank by law. The criteria
assigns weighted values to four main themes namely: (a) The chief executive of the Central Bank,
that mainly looks at the conditions of appointment and dismissal of the chief executive of the
Central Bank (b) the policy formulation cluster, which looks at the freedom of the Central Bank in
monetary policy formulation and the resolution of conflict between the government and the Bank.
It also looks at the participation of the Central Bank in the budget process, (c) the objectives of
the Central Bank, that address the issue of whether or not the Central Bank's main objective as
stipulated by its charter is to achieve price stability, (d) lending to the government, that is how the
Central Bank limits lending to government. This legal index has its own limitations as there is a
lot of divergence between what the law states and what is practiced more especially in the less
developed countries.
2
To address this limitation, the informal indicator which looks at the turnover of the governors
which was also developed by Cukierman et al (1994) was also used. This indicator was used on
the presumption that at least above some threshold more rapid turnover of governors indicates a
lower level of independence. More rapid turnover creates dependence because when politicians
frequently take the opportunity to choose a new governor, they will usually choose those who will
obey their wishes. Frequent turnover may reflect the firing of those who choose to challenge the
government. However, a low turnover rate does not necessarily imply high Central Bank
independence as a subservient governor may stay in office for a long time.
Another informal instrument, a questionnaire, which basically reqUlres the Central Bankers
themselves to rate their independence, was used to strengthen the research further. The
questionnaire was also developed by Cukierman et al (1994) (see annex 2 page 63).
On good governance the study used the criteria developed by Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2000)
(See Annex III page 65) that deals with accountability and transparency. The criterion has thirteen
components which are given a score of one each. The thirteen components are divided into three
main themes to do with accountability and transparency.
1.2. Main Challenges Faced by the Research
The project was faced by two main challenges. The first challenge is that the methodology used is
highly quantitative, which makes it likely to lose useful information which is qualitative in nature.
To mitigate this problem the research, apart from doing the calculations and administering the
questionnaire encouraged discussions that dealt with recent trends in Central Banking currently
toping debates.
The other weakness is the difficulty in comparing the results from the researcher's calculations
and those by Cukierman et al. (1994). The time periods in question are different making it difficult
to compare because Central Banking is dynamic. The analysis done by Cukierman et al. (1994)
was based on data collected in the period between 1980 and 1989 but Central Bank independence
generated considerable debate in the 1990's (Maxfield, 1997: 11; Padayachee, 2001:745). The
researcher's analysis has been done using data in the period 1989 to 2006. The incomparability of
the time periods should be borne in mind when interpreting the results.
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1.3. Summary of Findings
The aggregate score for the Reserve Bank of Malawi's independence under Legal Independence
Measure as calculated by the researcher was found to be 0.50. This is a very high score if we
compare with the results found by Cukierman et al. (1994). Despite having a high score the
Reserve Bank of Malawi act of 1989 still has some weaknesses in four areas namely: (a) Terms of
employment of the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Malawi (b) Limited independence in
monetary policy formulation and implementation (c) Absence of ranking in the objectives of the
central bank (d) Weak rules pertaining to lending to the government.
On the informal indicator of turnover of Central Bank governors, even though the results are
higher than the African average when we compare with Cukierman et al. (1994) results, there are
some weaknesses. It was found that there is some overlap between the political cycle and the
turnover of Central Bank governors which compromises Central Bank independence. Since the
inception of the multiparty system in Malawi a new governor is appointed a year after general
elections.
Under accountability and transparency the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act 1989 gets an aggregate
score of 5 out of 13 points which translates to 38.4%. The reason behind the poor score is that the
debate about accountability and transparency started to take shape later than 1989, after the
Reserve Bank of Malawi Act was formulated. During the 1980's, debates mainly concentrated on
Central Bank's independence and its impact on macroeconomic variables. Even though there are
some mechanisms in place to deal with accountability and transparency, the act does not mention
this since it was updated at a time when notions of accountability and transparency were still new.
1.4. Organization of the Dissertation
The dissertation has five chapters. Chapter Two, "Literature review, theory and methodology",
discusses theories and studies that have been conducted in this field both at international level and
in Malawi. The section also explains the methods used in data collection and analysis. Chapter
Three gives a brief description of the Malawi economy and a brief history of the Reserve Bank of
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Malawi and its monetary policies. Chapter Four discusses the results/findings and their
implications. The last chapter provides some recommendations and conclusion.
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Chapter 2: Literature, Theory and Methodology
2.1. Introduction
This chapter will review the debates on Central Bank independence. Some economists prefer
central bank independence while some oppose it. The chapter will also look at case studies which
try to link Central Bank independence and other macroeconomic variables such as inflation and
economic growth. The link between Central Bank independence on one side and accountability
and transparency on the other will be established by looking at how monetary policy should be
implemented and how the Central Bank should be organized to achieve this end for example, the
composition and size of the monetary policy committee. The chapter will conclude by outlining
theories and methodology that were used to collect and analyze the data.
The mam argument of the chapter is that most research on Central Bank independence and
governance has tended to concentrate on developed countries (Maxifield, 1997:9; Padayachee,
2001 :747; Lybek, 2004:8; Johnston, 2006:91). A few cases carried out in Malawi, such as those by
Sinoya (2001) and Simwaka (2004) have concentrated on the relationship between Central Bank
independence, inflation rates and economic growth rates and none has concentrated on good
governance.
2.2. Central Bank Independence
Some economists have looked at why governments opt for Central Bank independence both in
developing and developed democracies and how Central Bank independence affects other
macroeconomic variables (Cukierman, 1993; Maxfield, 1997; Johnson, 2007). For example,
Maxfield (2005:35) argues that one of the major reasons for Central Bank independence in
developing countries is to attract foreign investment. Maxfield points out that most explanations of
why governments cede authority to Central Banks focus on internal political causes while
neglecting external pressures. This closed-economy approach, she suggests, is particularly
inadequate when it comes to understanding why governments prefer Central Bank independence
in developing countries. She notes that there are several reasons for Central Bank independence in
developing countries. However the single most important factor that is overlooked in closed
economy models is the need for international credit and investment faced by developing countries'
governments. In her view, independent Central Banks promote lower inflation by curbing
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politicians' ability to manipulate money supply in order to create short-term growth. Politicians
may stimulate the economy at the expense of longer-term macroeconomic stability (Maxfield,
2005:35) thereby chasing away foreign investment. She proposes a model where the government
gives authority to Central Banks in order to signal their country's creditworthiness to international
investors. She notes that politicians are more likely to use Central Bank independence to attract
foreign investment, the larger the need for balance of payment support, the fewer the countries
restrictions on international financial transactions (Maxfield, 1997:35). Movement of foreign
investment is encouraged further by the reduction of barriers to international movement of
currency and other financial assets.
Still on the relationship between Central Bank Independence and credit worthiness, 10hnston also
provides reasons why developed and developing countries moved towards Central Bank
independence (Johnston, 2006:91). She notes that in industrialised countries where democracy
reached maturity, the granting of Central Bank independence was a domestic democratic decision.
The decision was made primarily for domestic economic reasons, resulting from a domestic
political debate, for example United Kingdom after 1997. As such, the Central Bank, though
independent, has a firm domestic political mandate for its mission. In developing countries Central
Bank independence is mainly targeted at signalling monetary policy credibility to international
financial actors and the transnational donor community played a key role in transforming the old
command institutions (Johnston, 2006:91). There is need therefore to build democratic support for
Central Bank independence for it to work in developing countries.
Apart from signalling creditworthiness supporters of Central Bank independence propose other
reasons for the move towards independence. They believe that leaving monetary policy to the state
has several disadvantages and it is imperative to shield monetary policy from government and
politicians. For example, Alesina (1989:57) argues that macroeconomics and politics are deeply
interconnected and that elections are either won or lost because of economic conditions. In trying
to establish the relationship between political cycles, inflation, economic growth and
unemployment, Alesina argues that there are several issues that motivate politicians to behave this
way. He notes that politicians are selfish in nature and they try to remain in office as long as
possible. Secondly politicians are usually partisan and they like to please their constituencies.
These motivations are usually at their peak during the times of elections. They try to create the
most favourable economic conditions just before elections even though these policies may have
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adverse effects. This tendency according to Alesina is unnecessary and suboptimal since the
timing of macroeconomic policy is artificially affected by the elections.
Alesina, contributing to the unemployment and inflation trade-off debate, notes that political
parties have different preferences on this trade-off as the outcomes have different redistributive
consequences (Alesina, 1989:58). Looking at the low-unemploymentlhigh-inflation scenario,
lower middle class people benefit from this while the opposite scenario favours the upper middle
class. Left wing parties therefore choose situations of high inflation and low unemployment. He
goes on to note that socialist parties usually understate the cost of inflation and over stimulate the
economy whereas conservative parties do not mind unemployment at all when they fight
inflation. Therefore it is better to leave decisions of the unemployment and inflation trade off to
the neutral central bankers than politicians.
Proponents of Central Bank Independence also argue that it reduces political conflicts over
monetary policy because political leaders cannot be blamed for unpopular decisions. Independent
Central Banks can be blamed for implementing unpopular but beneficial monetary policies
without taking into account the change in the political landscape more especially during election
years (Johnson, 2006:91). In this case Johnson argues that Central Bank independence is a public
good for democracies. The public prefers a lower rate of inflation than would obtain if politicians
controlled the Central Bank, and Central Bank independence ensures that this public preference is
respected.
It is argued further that guiding macroeconomic policy is a complicated and delicate task beyond
the comprehension of most non-economists and politicians. Highly educated Central Bank
professionals are best suited to make policy decisions (Stiglitz, 1997:np; Padayachee, 2001 :748;
Johnson, 2006:95). Delegating authority over monetary policy to such technocrats requires a
government that is ready to surrender its influence on macroeconomic variables to unelected
officials for the greater good of the country.
Critics of Central Bank independence counter these claims based on four major arguments. The
first argument is that independent Central Banks do not necessarily improve the overall economic
wellbeing of their countries (Stiglitz, 1997:np; Padayachee, 2001 :747; Johnson, 2006:94,9 5).
Economists widely concur that Central Bank Independence has no measurable impact on
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economic growth. Studies demonstrate that steadily moderate levels of inflation do not retard
economic growth, and may actually be beneficial in maintaining higher employment levels.
The second argument is that granting Central Bank independence violates the most important
tenets of democratic governance (Stiglitz, 1997:np; Johnson, 2006:95). First, they insist that it
violates the fundamental principles of democratic governance by concentrating immense power in
the hands of one unelected individual, the Central Bank governor. Stiglitz notes that the manner in
which the decision makers are chosen does not conform to democratic principles. He points out
that monetary policy is no more complicated and technical than many other fields such as health
care, taxation, or foreign policy and has no special qualities requiring its insulation from
democratic control and debate. In fact the field of monetary policy involves the trade off between
inflation rate and unemployment which affects the society as a whole. However the decisions
about the trade-off are made by a group of individuals who do not represent the society as a whole
due to their banking background (Stiglitz, 1997:np).
Critics further note that supporters of Central Bank independence assume that independent Central
Banks can reduce inflation at less cost than can more politically dependent ones and that once
inflation is left to rise it has a tendency to spiral out of control (Stiglitz, 1997:np; Padayachee,
2001:745; Johnson, 2006:95). Central Bank advocates have long believed that independent Central
Banks can reduce inflation at a lower societal cost specifically with fewer negative effects on
employment and output than can dependent ones, because people trust independent Central Banks
to do what they say they will do. Therefore people adjust quickly their expectations and wage
demands in response to the policies of independent Central Banks. According to Stiglitz, evidence
does not support this view because Central Bank Independence either has no effect or actually
raises the societal costs of disinflationary policies. This likely occurs because independent Central
Banks are so concerned with lowering inflation rates and preserving their reputations as credible
inflation fighters that they tend to adopt tight monetary policies. Moreover evidence does not
suggest that such moderate rates of inflation exhibit a tendency to develop into unquestionably
damaging hyperinflations.
Fundamentally Central Bank independence exists on a continuum. According to Cukierman
(1993), Lybek (2004) and Johnson (2006), a Central Bank has the highest independence when the
governor enjoys a term of at least eight years, its board members hold lengthy terms not
synchronized with the electoral cycle, the appointment process is clear and relatively apolitical,
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and the governor and board members must possess particular professional qualifications and may
not simultaneously hold other posts or represent the government. A Central Bank is at its most
economically independent if it has a clear legal mandate to protect price stability, if it may not
finance the government, and if it alone determines monetary policy, controls its own budget and
sets its own salaries and fees, and possesses a range of monetary-policy instruments. The
underlying presumption is that the more independence, the better. While no Central Banks
unambiguously meet all these criteria, many exhibit high levels of de jure independence.
According to Lybek there are several levels of Central Bank independence in relation to the
Central Bank charters or acts (Lybek, 2004:3-5). A distinction can be made between the following
kinds of autonomy: (i) goal autonomy, (ii) target autonomy, (iii) instrument autonomy and (iv)
limited autonomy.
Lybek (2004:3-5) considers goal autonomy as the highest level of independence a bank can be
accorded. Goal autonomy is the broadest since in principle it gives the Central Bank authority to
determine its primary objective among several competing objectives included in the Central Bank
charter/act. This requires the government to choose the exchange rate regime and monetary policy
and in the case of floating exchange rate, the bank is just expected to choose the monetary policy.
The bank basically chooses some goals among several goals or determines a goal in the absence of
goals. Lybek gives an example of the Federal Reserve System in the United States which includes
both full employment and price stability among several potentially competing objectives even
though price stability is given priority.
Target autonomy is the second highest level of independence based on the ranking by Lybek
(2004:3-5). The Central Bank is also expected to determine monetary policy and the exchange rate
regime, or simply monetary policy where the exchange rate is floating. The only difference with
goal autonomy is that target autonomy means the bank is given one clearly defined objective by
law. Target autonomy allows the Central Bank to decide a specific target for achieving the primary
objective, which is stipulated in the law, such as price stability. Goal and target autonomy are
perceived as strong degrees of autonomy, but they also raise the question why Central Bankers,
who are not elected by the general public, should be given that much power and autonomy to
decide the short-term trade-off between the rate of inflation and employment (Stiglitz1997:np).
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Instrument autonomy according to Lybek signifies less independence in that the government or the
legislature decides the target, in agreement with the Central Bank and the exchange rate regime,
but the Central Bank retains sufficient authority to implement the monetary policy target using the
instruments it sees fit. One example is the Reserve Bank Act of New Zealand. There may also be a
contract or an agreement between the government and the Central Bank that is not explicitly
stipulated in the Central Bank law, as for example in Canada and Norway. Instrument autonomy
implies that the cabinet or the legislature actually decides the target, in agreement with the Central
Bank, but the Central Bank retains sufficient authority to implement the target using the
instruments it sees fit.
Lastly, limited or no autonomy means that the Central Bank is almost a government agency. The
government determines the policies (objectives and targets) as well as influences the
implementation. The latter is the case mainly in centrally planned economies and in some
developing countries.
Despite different people having different views on the desirability of central bank independence
and its impact on macroeconomic variables, there is consensus that central bank independence is
good for development (Arnone, Laurens, and Segalotto, 2006, Arnone, Laurens, Segalotto, and
Martin, 2007). For example there is belief that central bank independence will CBA may help
countries achieve lower average inflation, cushion the impact of political cycles on economic
cycles, enhance financial system stability, and boost fiscal discipline (Arnone et al.: 2006).
Arnone et al. noted that there has been an increase in number of countries who are pursuing central
bank independence. Arnone notes that a vast majority of central banks have been mandated to set
price stability as one of the objectives of monetary policy. In addition, most central banks have
autonomy with respect to setting the policy rate and are not required to extend direct credit to the
government. These are indicators of greater central bank independence.
Arnone et al. also notes that in a number of emerging markets and developing countries, CB
autonomy has gained momentum in the course of the last decade. This has been accomplished
through a consistent political will and a strong interest in central bank reform, leading to rapid
progress in terms of both policy and instrument autonomy. These developments were underpinned
by the growing consensus among developed and developing countries about the benefits for
overall economic performance to be expected from assigning price stability as the primary
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objective of the central bank, and limiting the scope for the monetization of public deficits. As a
consequence, today we can see an approximately equal distribution of autonomy among countries,
irrespective of the level of economic development.
2.3. Good Governance (Transparency and Accountability)
International financial Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank have
made Central Bank accountability and transparency part of their development agenda. They argue
that when the state delegates authority to a Central Bank and gives it autonomy, there is need to
make the Central Bank accountable to ensure appropriate checks and balances to minimize abuse
of powers (Lybek, 2004: 10; Koch, 2007: 1). The accountability provisions should thus ensure that
an autonomous Central Bank uses its delegated authority effectively to achieve its primary
objectives, and manages its resources well. The independent Central Bank is ultimately though
indirectly accountable to the general public, but directly accountable to the executive branch or the
legislature (Fraser, 1994:7; Eijffinger & Hoeberichts, 2000: 1-2; Quintyn, 2007:n.p.).
Even though most banks are in essence not directly accountable to the general public, the bank
needs to take the needs of the general public seriously (Mendon<;a, Ferreira, Filho, and Simao,
2007). Most of the times according to Mendon<;a et al. (2007), decisions made by the central bank
affect inflation, unemployment and interest rates. For example, Central Banks define the interest
rate taking into consideration the departure of the expected inflation from its target value, and a
disinflation process in the economy is thus associated with an increase in the interest rate and this
in turn affects the general public and poverty. Central bank transparency plays an important role
in the reduction of poverty because it increases the information set available to the public and
reduces the asymmetries of information, and in the end reduces the gap between the projected
value of a variable and the realized value of the variable. For example increasing central bank
transparency contributes to the convergence of inflation expectation and inflation target creating
credibility and enhancing inflation control.
Accountability and transparency can be expressed in many ways since it is guided by varying
charters. For example, in New Zealand the governor reports progress to government in achieving
the governments specified target periodically while in the United States of America the chairman
of the Federal Reserve is obliged by the Humphrey - Hawkins Act to report to congress several
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times a year. In Australia the Reserve Bank produces quarterly articles, annual and parliamentary
reports and the governor makes several speeches. This serves to increase the transparency of the
monetary policy and to avoid confusion in the market (Fraser, 1994:7). In South Africa the Central
Bank is not directly accountable to Parliament, However South African Reserve Bank submits its
Annual and Financial reports to the Portfolio Committee on Finance which submits to parliament
(Reserve Bank of South Africa, 2008:np). In Malawi the Governor reports to parliament about
monetary policy at irregular intervals but he is not compelled by the law to do that (Sato, 2001:7).
Just like the South African case the Governor submits annual reports 0 the Minister of Finance
who forwards it to the Business Committee of Parliament.
Central Bank governance is also looked at in different ways depending on the approaches taken.
For example Koch looks at governance as having two branches, external and internal governance
(Koch, 2007:2-4). According to Koch, external governance is related to factors associated with the
political environment in which the Central Bank operates and over which the Central Bank has
limited control. It mainly deals with the role and function of the Central Bank within society, and
it varies from country to country. External governance is also associated with how parameters are
set for monetary policy, currency issuance payment and settlement system oversight and/or
delivery, and acting as the lender of last resort. The extent to which this affects Central Bank is
dependent upon the level of independence accorded to the bank. Lastly, external governance is
usually dependent upon whether the Central Bank is independent of the government or legislature
on choosing targets and on how to achieve these targets. Internal governance deals with how the
Central Bank conducts its business within the context of external governance. Internal governance
is mainly to deal with oversight, management and organization of the Bank. Examples of issues
that fall under internal governance are the size and composition of the board, powers conferred to
the members of the board and their independence, how sub-committee work is handled, the
presence of the monetary policy committee, its composition and its skills endowment.
The last approach to good governance the research followed is that proposed by Amtenbrink
(2004:2). Amtenbrink looks at good governance as a combination of three pillars namely: Central
Bank independence, accountability and transparency. Even though he discusses the three concepts
as three different issues he is quick to point out that in practice they are very difficult to separate.
He notes that the key to good governance lies in the combined application of these principles in
designing the legal framework of a Central Bank. Monetary policy in his understanding is taken as
being at the heart of good governance and hence institutional arrangements of the Central Bank
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should first of all deal with this aspect (Amtenbrink, 2004:9). The three pillars should therefore be
used to steer two important relationships which are very central to the conduct of monetary policy.
The relationships are monetary policy formulation and communication and relationship between
the Central Bank and the government.
The first point Amtenbrink makes is the importance of having an accountability yardstick to
measure the performance of the Central Bank in achieving its monetary policy objectives (2004:2).
The monetary policy objective of a Central Bank, as well as its projections on monetary policy can
form the basis of such a yardstick. A clear monetary policy objective reduces the risk of political
pressure and avoids opening conflicts between government and the Central Bank while at the same
time ensuring that the Central Bank does in fact follow a low inflation monetary policy. When
there is a case of multiple objectives the Central Bank Charter should clearly rank the objectives in
terms of importance, even though it becomes quite difficult when the Central Bank is given the
mandate to choose the objectives. The classic example for a Central Bank featuring multiple
objectives according to Amtenbrink is the United States Federal Reserve System. The ideal way
of achieving accountability is making inflation the only objective of the Central Bank
(Amtenbrink, 2004:2).
Apart from having explicitly defined goals the other aspect of monetary policy should be
transparency. Amtenbrink (2004:12) notes that a clear understanding by the market participants of
the underlying framework on which Central Bank decisions are based will lead to a better
understanding of the decisions taken. Market participants should know what the Central Bank has
in mind when it sets interest rates and be able to clearly distinguish between the instruments of
monetary policy and the operational target that is affected by the Central Bank's action. To this
end, the Central Bank should announce the monetary policy strategy and explain its monetary
policy decisions. This has the advantage that it reduces the ability of politicians to influence
monetary policy.
The other main point made by Amtenbrink is the institutional set-up of a Central Bank when it
comes to communication with the public. The effect of monetary policy on inflation and output
growth (outcome) is determined not only by monetary policy decisions, but also by the
expectations and the behaviour of the public, based on their understanding of the bank's strategy
(Amtenbrink, 2004:12). Therefore the bank is charged with the responsibility of facilitating the
general understanding by the general public of what the Central Bank is doing by publications and
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public statements just to name a few. This includes public access to the economic data underlying
monetary policy decisions, such as money supply, inflation, output and unemployment rates, as
well as the announcement of the economic models applied by the Central Bank.
Amtenbrink (2004: 15-17) argues further that while the transparent conduct of monetary policy
supports both parliament and the executive in its decision-making process about the performance
of the Central Bank, its connection with the government is also important more especially when
one considers the link between monetary policy and fiscal policy. One way to enhance the
communication between the Central Bank and government is to allow the participation of
government officials in Central Bank organs more especially the monetary policy committee of
the Central Bank in non-voting capacity. He notes that this is a difficult arrangement as the
governor of the Central Bank is considered by law to be responsible for monetary policy and
hence charged with taking the relevant decisions. Representation on the monetary policy board
creates a forum for government to promote its views on the general economic situation. At the
same time those charged with deciding on monetary policy can explain the approach to monetary
policy to the state/government.
There are several studies that have tried to look at the sizes of Monetary Policy Committees and
what determines the size of the Monetary Policy Committees. One notable study is that done by
Berger, H., Nitsch, V. and Lybek, T. (2006). Berger et al. tried to analyse empirically the
difference between the size of Central Banks Monetary Policy Committees world wide using a
sample of 113 countries and he found that the size and composition of the Monetary Policy
Committees varies according to some country specific characteristics. Their results indicate that
Monetary Policy Committees size is positively correlated with measures of country size and
Central Bank's information-processing requirements and the level of economic development.
They also found that Monetary Policy Committees size is related to a country's political
institutions, with more democratic countries having, on average, larger boards. Finally, Monetary
Policy Committee size is often associated with other Central Bank characteristics. For example,
Central Banks that have greater formal autonomy over objectives and targets, a more complex
monetary strategy, a longer history, and more staff typically have more board members who serve,
on average, shorter terms. Their study concludes by giving several recommendations.
The first recommendation is that the governance structure to be put in place for a Central Bank
should acknowledge the type of autonomy delegated to it. It is useful to make a distinction
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between goal autonomy, target autonomy, instrument autonomy, and limited or no autonomy as
noted by Lybek (2004) since it helps define the functions of the respective governing boards and
management. In addition, a range of country specific factors, including economic development
(preference for price stability), its history, political system (importance of election cycles), and
judicial traditions (particularly corporate law and the rule of law) must also be given due
consideration. Thus the number of bodies, their size and composition can be determined with a
view to ensure an informed, balanced, and professional view without conflicts of interest. In short,
it is important to remember that one size does not fit all.
They point out that the policy board must be broad and large enough to guarantee a balanced and
an informed view of things in terms of decision making. The members should be well educated
since this is a specialised technical field and that the board should include professionals from
different sectors and regions and while at the same time ensuring that the size does not impede the
effectiveness.
With a view to avoiding conflicts of interest, members may be executives or full-time directors of
the Central Bank. However, to ensure a balanced view and to alleviate concerns about Central
Banks being too conservative and to a lesser extent to address a perceived democratic deficit,
outside members with special expertise should also be considered. If such a board only comprises
internal members, whose career depends on the governor, these members will give priority to their
fiduciary responsibilities. It may thus be useful to have qualified non executive directors, such as
experts from academia or business, provided the autonomy of the Central Bank is not eroded.
2.4. Theory and Methodology
As stated in the introduction, to measure the independence of the Reserve Bank of Malawi the
project used the criteria developed by Cukierman et al (1994) (see Annexe 1 page 59). This
measure is based on the coding of the Central Bank charter and it is called the legal independence
measure since it is based on the degree of independence conferred on the Central Bank by law.
This index has its own limitations as there are a lot of differences between what the law states and
what is usually practiced more especially in the less developed countries (Cukierman et aI.,
1994: 13). To address this problem the informal indicator looking at the turnover of governors will
be used. This indicator is used on the presumption that at least above some threshold more rapid
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turnover of governors indicates a lower level of independence (Cukierman et aI., 1994:13). The
project also used a questionnaire developed by Cukierman et al (1994) where the Central Bankers
were expected to rank themselves according to what happens during implementation.
On good governance the study will use the criteria developed by Eijffinger & Hoeberichts (2000)
(See Annex III page 65) that deals with accountability and transparency. The criterion has thirteen
components which are given a score of one each. The twelve components are divided into two
main themes to do with accountability and transparency. The criterion is mainly based on the
Central Bank charter therefore prone to the weakness of the discrepancy between the act and
actual implementation. To balance up Eijffinger & Hoeberichts added more indicators which are
not legal in nature such as the count of speeches by the chief executives and publication of
minutes of monetary policy meetings.
This set of instruments of data collection were chosen because they have been used widely to
measure Central Bank independence and good governance and this makes comparison and
interpretation of our findings easier and meaningful. Apart from this set of instruments in depth
interviews were conducted that involved senior Central Bank officials and senior ministry of
finance officials to capture some issues which are qualitative in nature or not captured by the
indicators mentioned above.
2.5. Coding of Legal Independence and Factors Guiding Allocations of
Points.
Coding of the Central Bank independence followed two principles developed by Cukierman et al.
(1994). Firstly narrow precise legal characteristics of Reserve Bank of Malawi Act will be coded.
Secondly only written information from the act will be used. Additional information on how the
law is implemented was deliberately left out since it is reflected by informal indicators of Central
Bank independence. These principles make it possible to determine the degree of independence
on various legal dimensions with relatively small amount of subjective judgment and to focus on
concrete details of the law (Cukierman et al. 1994:5). The legal characteristics of the Central Bank
independence as stated in its charter/act are grouped into four clusters.
17
The clusters were built from sixteen different legal variables each coded on a scale of 0 (smallest
level of independence) to 1 (highest level of independence). The detailed classification and coding
appear in Annexe 2 attached. The codes are set so that a higher number indicates what is expected
to be a stronger mandate and greater autonomy for the Central Bank to pursue price stability
(Cukierman et al. 1994:5, 9, 10). These clusters are divided as follows:
a) The chief executive of the Central Bank, which mainly looks at the appointment and dismissal
of the chief executive of the Central Bank. Those Central Banks which have longer terms of office
than those of the executive branch and those Central Banks which are not influenced by the
executive branch in appointing or dismissal of the chief executive are regarded as more
independent on the chief executive officer dimension (Cukierman et aI., 1994:9, 10).
b) the policy formulation cluster, which concerns the resolution of conflict between the executive
branch and the Central Bank as well as the participation of the Central Bank in the budget process,
those Central Banks with more freedom to formulate monetary policy and to ignore pressures
from the government in times of conflict are regarded as more independent in terms of policy
formulation (Cukierman et aI., 1994:9, 10).
c) The objectives cluster addresses the issue of whether or not the Central Bank's main objective
as stipulated by its charter is to achieve price stability. The objective variable is designed to
capture the legal mandate of the bank to individually pursue price stability. When the Central
Bank charter specifies price stability as the main or only goal, the bank is classified as being more
independent on this dimension than a Central Bank with objectives in addition to but not
inconsistent with price stability such as full employment. Even though there are six possible
ratings that act as guides to coding, this cluster is not very good at showing independence as
compared to the Chief Executive Officer and Monetary Policy variables (Cukierman et aI., 1994:9,
10).
d) Lending to the government cluster looks at how the Central Bank limits lending to government.
Central Banks which have got tight rules for lending to government are regarded as very
independent compared to those that have weaker rules. These limitations encompass a number of
more detailed variables such as advances and securitised lending and restrictions on maturities and
on interest rates. According to Cukierman et al. (1994), the stricter the limitations the higher the
independence and the higher the score given to the bank on that dimension. The comparability of
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various types of limitations is complicated because the limitations are specified in different ways
in different countries based on the charter. In a small number of countries limitations on lending
are specified in absolute cash amounts and in others, as a percentage of government's revenue
from taxes and in a majority of cases as a percentage of government's expenditures (Cukierman et
aI., 1994: 10). However, other things being equal, the absolute cash limits are tougher than limits in
terms of Central Bank liabilities which in turn are more binding than limits in terms of
government revenues. The most accommodative limits are those that are specified in terms of
government's expenditures.
Limitations on lending are also classified as stricter the nearer the rates paid by government to
market rates and the shorter the time maturities of the loans from the Central Bank are to public
sector. The stricter and narrower the circle of institutions that are allowed to borrow from the
Central Bank, the smaller the discretion of the executive branch to decide to whom and how much
Central Bank will lend (Cukierman et aI., 1994:9,10). In addition, Central Bank laws prohibit the
Central Bank from buying government bonds from the primary market are considered stickier than
laws that do not contain such a prohibition. These individual clusters are aggregated to come up
with one final value which rates the aggregate/overall independence of the Central Banks which
will be compared with studies undertaken already in other countries.
2.6. Informal Measures of Central Bank Independence
As noted above legal measures of Central Bank independence do have shortfalls in that they are
usually incomplete and can carry different meanings. The other shortfall is that even if the laws
were very specific, the situation on the ground may be different as there is a tendency to divert
from legal independence more especially in less developed countries (Cukierman et aI., 1994: 10).
To compensate for this weakness Cukierman et al 1994, proposed some informal indicators that
are complementary to the legal independence measures. The first indicator looks at the turnover of
Central Bank governors. This indicator assumes that rapid turnover of governors beyond some
threshold indicates lower levels of independence and creates dependence. It assumes that frequent
turnovers accord politicians the opportunity to choose governors who are subservient to the
government. Rapid turnover may also indicate that the government is firing the governors who
challenge the government. If the tenure of the governor drops to about 0 .2 or 0.25 it means that
the independence of the Central Bank is under threat and these levels are taken as the threshold. If
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converted these threshold figures translate to four or five years (this coincides with the political
cycle which is at least 4 yrs). Care should be taken in interpreting these values because low
turnover sometimes may mean lower independence of the Central Banle A subservient governor
may stay in the seat for a longer time ifhe does what the politicians wants him to do.
Apart from using the turnover of Central Bank governors a questionnaire (developed by
Cukierman) was sent to the monetary policy specialist of the Reserve Bank of Malawi and
Ministry of Finance for completion. The questionnaire captures the same issues that were
discussed in the legal independence measure only that the questions focus on the implementation
of the law other than the law itself. The questionnaire has additional variables such as credit from
the bank to the private sector, limitations on lending to the government and interest rates (refer to
Annexe Il page 68 for details).
The questionnaire is divided into seven parts each part depicting a certain aspect of Reserve Bank
of Malawi. The first part looks at whether the terms of board of directors and the governor's are
likely to coincide with that of the government. If the turnover of the governor and the director
coincides with that of the government, the less independent the Central Bank and vice versa. The
second part deals with the actual limitations on lending in practice. Even though we looked at the
same variables as in legal independence this variable looks at what happens during the actual
practice of lending and it checks if the laws are followed to the book. Part three looks at how
conflicts are resolved between the Central Bank and government whereas section four captures
financial independence i.e. the determination of the Central Bank budget and setting salaries of
senior bank officials. Section five looks at the targets of the Central Bank being pre-commitments
agreed to by the bank and government. Section six of the questionnaire tackles the issues of
importance attached to price stability by the bank while section seven looks at the extent to which
the Central Bank handles the competing objective of boosting growth through subsidized credit.
2.7. Coding, Accountability and Transparency
Under accountability and transparency the project used the criteria developed by Eijffinger and
Hoeberichts (2000) (See Annex III page 65). They pose 13 different questions and the total
number of positive answers determines the score for the Central Bank concerned. Each question
carries a mark of one if a certain aspect is present in the charter or zero if absent. It should be
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pointed out that this indicator, like the indicators for Central Bank independence discussed
previously, is based on Central Bank laws therefore they have the weakness that they may not be
matched by implementation. The indicators have been divided into three sections namely: ultimate
objective of the monetary policy (accountability), transparency and final responsibility of
monetary policy.
Under the ultimate objective of the monetary policy there is need for a Central Bank to have clear
well defined objectives which can be used as a yardstick for measuring the bank's performance in
implementing monetary policy. If the bank has one objective it is easier to measure its
performance towards achieving the objective. However, where there are several objectives it is
advisable to rank the objectives according to their priority. The type of questions that are tackled
in the ultimate objectives are whether the Central Bank law stipulates the monetary policy
objective, is there prioritisation in the objectives and whether the objectives are quantified.
Transparency is one of the key elements of monetary policy since information dissemination can
be used to communicate the targets that need to be achieved and progress towards achieving the
objectives (De Haan, J., Amtenbrink, F., and. Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1999; Eijffinger & Hoeberichts,
2000). Even if clear objectives are missing the Central Bank can be judged depending on what
targets it sets itself by looking at the information disseminated. Therefore a Central Bank should
report at regular intervals on its past performance and future plans for monetary policy in
accordance with the monetary policy objective. Ideally laws should clearly prescribe avenues for
discussing monetary policy such as reports, minutes and speeches. These laws could even go
further to specifically state what should be included in the reports and the presentation. The reports
or minutes could provide the reasoning behind a certain decision made. This becomes a topic of
debate when it comes to communicating the voting patterns of the monetary policy committee
since it could undermine the credibility of a decision taken by only a slight majority (De Haan et
al. 1999; Eijffinger & Hoeberichts 2000). Some of the questions that were looked at in the coding
of this section are as follows: 1) Must the Central Bank publish an inflation or monetary policy
report of some kind in addition to the standard Central Bank bulletins/report? 2) Are minutes of
meetings of the governing board of the Central Bank made public within a reasonable time? 3)
Must the Central Bank explain publicly to which extent it has been able to reach its objectives?
The last part of the criterion developed by Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2000) deals with final
responsibility. This looks at who bares the final responsibility of monetary policy. There are two
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competing proposals whether responsibility should be pushed towards government or parliament
(Eijffinger & Hoeberichts, 2000: 16). Through their studies they were able to prove that credibility
is at its highest when the bank searches for transparency through availing information to the public
or is answerable to the parliament. If that is not the case then the Government which reports to the
parliament should bare the responsibility of monetary policy but on the condition that there should
be a clear and transparent process as to how government overrides decisions made by the Central
Bank. The questions to be looked at in this section are as follows:
Is the Central Bank subject to monitoring by Parliament (is there a requirement apart from
an annual report to report to Parliament and/or explain policy actions in Parliament)?
Does the government have the right to give instructions?
Is past performance a ground for dismissal of a Central Bank governor?
Is there some kind of review in the procedure to apply the overriding mechanism (when
government overrides the decisions by the Central Bank) (Eijffinger & Hoeberichts,
2000: 16-17).
2.8. Summary
This chapter has noted that there has been an increasing trend in Central Banks becoming
independent since the 1990's. The main reason why states prefer Central Bank Independence as
argued by many economist is that they would like to attract foreign investment. This is
encouraged further by the reduction of barriers to international movement of currency and other
financial assets.
Apart from issues of Central Bank independence and other macroeconomic variables, the other
debate that is taking centre stage is Central Bank governance. International financial institutions
such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank have made Central Bank accountability
and transparency part of their development agenda. They argue that when the state delegates
authority and autonomy to the Central Bank there is a need to make the Central Bank accountable
to ensure appropriate checks and balances to minimize abuse of powers. The accountability
provisions should thus ensure that an autonomous Central Bank uses its delegated authority
effectively to achieve its primary objectives, and manage its resources well.
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The chapter also noted that good governance is made of three pillars namely, Central Bank
independence, accountability and transparency. Even though these pillars are entities in
themselves in practice they are very difficult to separate. He notes that the key to good governance
lies in the combined application of these principles in designing the legal framework of a Central
Bank. The three pillars should therefore be used to steer two important relationships which are
very central to the conduct of monetary policy. The relationships are monetary policy formulation
and communication and relationship between the Central Bank and the government.
To measure the independence of the Reserve Bank of Malawi the project the criterion developed
by Cukierman et al (1994). This measure is based on the coding of the Central Bank charter and it
is called the Legal Independence Measure since it is based on the degree of independence
conferred to the Central Bank by law. This measure has its own limitations therefore the project
used other informal measures such as turnover of Central Bank governors and questionnaire. On
good governance the study used the criterion developed by Eijffinger & Hoeberichts (2000) that
deals with accountability and transparency. The criterion has thirteen components which are given
a score of one each.
This set of instruments of data collection were chosen because they have been used widely to
measure Central Bank independence and good governance and this makes comparison and
interpretation of our findings easier and meaningful.
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Chapter 3: Background - The Malawi Economy and the History of
the Reserve Bank of Malawi
3.1. Introduction
This chapter provides a brief summary of economic conditions in Malawi. It presents trends in
major macroeconomic variables namely economic growth and inflation rate. This is supported by
reasons behind major changes in the economic variables. The chapter also discusses the history of
the Reserve Bank of Malawi more specifically its monetary policies.
3.2. Malawi Economy in Brief
Malawi is a densely populated landlocked country with its economy heavily dependent on
agriculture (UNDP, 2000:2-3). Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world and in Sub-
Saharan Africa with over 52% of the population below the poverty line of 1USD (UNDP,
2005:np). With a Gross National Product per capita ofUS$190 and a Human Development Index
of 0.397 in 1999, Malawi ranked eighth and twelfth from the bottom, respectively (UNDP,
2000:np). Its major exports are tobacco and tea. Agriculture on average represents 34.7% of GDP
(see figure 1 page 25, contribution to GDP in 2006 by sector). Smallholder farmers produce a
variety of crops, including maize, beans, rice, cassava, tobacco, and groundnuts. The agricultural
sector contributes about 63.7% of total income for the rural population, 65% of manufacturing
sector's raw materials, and approximately 87% of total employment (Government of Malawi,
2007:np).
Malawi's economic reliance on the export of agricultural commodities renders it particularly
vulnerable to external and internal shocks such as declining terms of trade, drought and
governance. High transport costs, which can comprise over 30% of its total import bill, constitute
a serious impediment to economic development and trade (Reserve Bank of Malawi, 2000:np).
However, recent government initiatives targeting improvements in the road infrastructure, together
with private sector participation in railroad and telecommunications, have begun to render it more
attractive to investment (Government of Malawi, 2006:np).
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Adapted from Malawi government, 2007
Malawi has also undertaken economic structural adjustment programs supported by the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other donors since early eighties (Reserve
Bank of Malawi, 2000:np). Broad reform objectives include stimulation of private sector activity
and participation through the elimination of price controls and industrial licensing, liberalization
of trade and foreign exchange, rationalization of taxes, privatization of state-owned enterprises and
civil service reform. According to Government of Malawi in May 2002, the IMF program which
begun in 2000 was cancelled and a Staff-Monitored Program (SMP) was put in place
(Government of Malawi, 2007:np). The main goal of the SMP was to give the Malawi government
a chance to establish a track record of fiscal discipline. A new Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility (PRGF) was approved on August 5, 2005 after a successful SMP. In August 2006 Malawi
successfully reached the completion point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative, resulting in debt relief from multilateral and bilateral creditors. Over $2 billion in debt
has since been cancelled, enabling the government to increase expenditures in development
initiatives. A new PRGF has since been undertaken (Government of Malawi, 2007:np).
The picture on real GDP growth has been irregular with the latest figures showing that real GDP
grew by 5% in 2004, 2.1 % in 2005 and 8.4 in 2006 (see figure 2, page 26 on real GDP from 2003
to 2005) (Government of Malawi, 2007:np). However between 1990 and 2000 macroeconomic
stability and growth had been difficult to maintain with years of growth being followed by years
of deterioration largely influenced by both political and climatic developments (UNDP, 2000:2).
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The figure on inflation has also been mixed even though the current trend shows a reduction.
Between 2001 and 2007, inflation reached the highest in 2001 when it reached 24.5% and the
lowest at 7.7% mid June, 2007. In Malawi 50% of inflation is determined by food prices which are
prone to natural catastrophes such as weather and drought making it difficult to manage(Reserve
Bank of Malawi, 2000:np). The lowering of the inflation could be attributed to bumper harvest due
to government polices and the reduction of unnecessary expenditures on the fiscal side
(Government of Malawi, 2007:np). For example, during the 2004/2005 the government distributed
fertilizer and seeds to two million farmers and each farmer received 31Kilograms of fertilizer and
seeds in order to enable the farmers to produce more food. This came to a total of 62 million
Kilograms of targeted input product that was distributed in one year making it the largest
distribution in the history of Malawi. In 2006 the government decided to introduce a universal
subsidy on fertilizer and maize and this resulted into the country producing a surplus for the first
























Adapted from Malawi government, 2007
On the fiscal side the government established clear performance criteria and benchmarks by which
government spending was regularly audited and validated by independent auditors (Government
of Malawi, 2007:np). The government went further to design an efficient system of financial
management and monitoring the allocation and utilization of all resources so that fraud could be
detected as it occurs in the project or programme cycle and prompt measures are taken to address
the situation. The government ensured that there is an established system that ensures swift
investigation, prosecution and punishment of public officers at all levels of responsibilities that are
found guilty of corruption, theft, mismanagement, and abuse of power in all its forms. Lastly, the
government strengthened the offices of the Accountant General, Auditor General, Public Accounts
Committee and the Anti-Corruption Bureau, to ensure that officials and those entrusted with
public funds are fully accountable and act in a transparent manner in the utilization, and reporting
of public funds (Government of Malawi, 2006:np).
3.3. History of Monetary Policy in Malawi
The Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) was created in 1965 after gaining independence from the
British in 1964. This was the period soon after the Second World War when less developed
countries were establishing their own Central Banks (Parson, 2005 :np). This was more of a
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political decision than economic as former colonies wanted to signal self government and assert
their independence. The Reserve Bank of Malawi has been mainly using exchange rates and
interest rates adjustments as major instruments for monetary policy and to influence major
macroeconomic variables such as growth and price stability (RBM, 2000:np). This is grounded in
the belief that the choice of an exchange rate policy in the country has an important role to play in
creating the proper environment for economic growth. The exchange rate policy chosen affects the
country's relative price structure between tradable and non-tradable goods and ultimately the
overall level of domestic prices (RBM, 2000:np). Thus, a particular exchange rate system chosen
does have far-reaching effects on the entire economy. Regarding interest rates, until the late 1970s
Malawi experienced a high degree of financial repression, with administered interest rates, credit
ceilings, segmented capital markets and excessive intermediation costs (RBM, 2000; Sato, 2000).
As part of structural adjustment programs supported by the World Bank and the IMF, Malawi has
been implementing structural reforms in the financial system since the 1980s (RBM, 2000). The
main objective of these reforms has been more efficient mobilization of resources and optimal
resource allocation.
3.3.1. Exchange Rate Developments in Malawi
The Government of Malawi has been using the exchange rate as an instrument of monetary policy
since its establishment in 1965 (RBM, 2000). According to RBM, during this time Malawi was
using the British pound as its currency but was later dropped to the Malawian Kwacha in 1971.
The Malawi Kwacha was pegged to the British pound at the ratio of one to one and any changes in
the British Pound meant changes in the Malawi Kwacha. For example, the British Pound was
devalued by 14 percent in 1968 and the Kwacha was devalued by the same margin (RBM,
2000:np). During this period, many developed countries including the United Kingdom,
maintained a fixed exchange rate system with the gold or the US Dollar.
During the course of 1971, problems arising from limited gold supply began to surface; and by
1973 this system completely collapsed as most major countries renounced the par value system
(RBM, 2000:np). This was followed by the generalized floating of exchange rates by several
countries which caused large volatilities in currency markets. The Malawian Kwacha, as was
expected, depreciated along with the British Pound to which it was pegged. Authorities, thus,
began to think of other ways of managing the exchange rate.
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From November 19, 1973, Malawi authorities responded to the movements in the international
currencies by de-linking the Malawi Kwacha from the British Pound, and pegging it to a trade-
weighted basket of the British Pound and the US Dollar (RBM, 2000:np). This system required the
RBM to determine the exchange rate by setting daily buying and selling rates for the US Dollar
and the British Pound in light of foreign exchange market developments. This phase ended in June
1975 when authorities started pursuing an active exchange rate policy which involved announced
devaluations of the Kwacha whenever a need arose. However, the continued instability in the
major international currencies forced authorities to look for a permanent peg, preferably to a
currency which was considered less liable to violent movements. Authorities thought the Special
Drawing Rights DR was suitable for this purpose.
With effect from 9 June, 1975, the Malawi Kwacha was pegged to the IMF's Special Drawing
Rights (SDR). For sometime, the peg to the SDR seemed to have worked better for the economy
as evidenced by the temporary stability achieved with the new peg at a time when major
international currencies were experiencing violent movements (RBM, 2000:np). These benefits,
however, proved to be only short-lived as the SDR began to appreciate in chorus with the US
dollar in the early 1980s. The Malawi Kwacha responded by appreciating along with the SDR.
This did not go well with Malawi authorities as it constrained export development.
It must also be recalled that at the beginning of the 1980s, Malawi's sound economic performance
was seriously disrupted by several shocks (RBM, 2000:np). One of the external factors was
deterioration in the country's terms of trade which resulted largely from weak external demand for
the country's primary products in world markets. As the SDR continued to appreciate, Malawi
authorities had to take active exchange rate actions with the view to restraining the terms of trade
from further deterioration. Hence on April 24, 1982 the Kwacha was devalued by 15 percent. This
was followed by another devaluation of 12 percent on 17 September, 1983. These actions,
however, failed to redress the situation as the country was also severely affected by a drought
which curtailed agricultural production, thereby adding pressure on the country's balance of
payments.
Despite the devaluations carried out in 1982 and 1983, the country's external situation continued to
deteriorate, which was worsened by the disruption of the traditional transport routes to the ports of
Beira and Nacala due to political conflicts in Mozambique. On 17 January, 1984 authorities de-
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linked the Malawi Kwacha from the SDR and pegged it to a trade weighted-basket of seven
currencies representing the geographical composition of Malawi's trade and the currencies used in
settling the country's international transactions (Currencies in the basket and their weights were as
follows: US dollar (27 %); Pound Sterling (27 %); South Africa rand (18 %); German Deutsche
mark (7 %); Japanese yen (7 %); French franc (7 %); and the Netherlands Guilder (7 %)(RBM,
2000:np). During this regime, the rate of the Malawi Kwacha exchange rate as quoted by the
Reserve Bank of Malawi was determined on the basis of the daily calculations of the exchange
rate of the US dollar in terms of the SDR. Rates of other currencies were quoted by the Reserve
Bank on the basis of the appropriate daily cross rates as communicated by the IMF. Frequent
adjustments were made with the view to realigning the Kwacha with the basket taking into
account inflation differentials.
Although the peg to the trade-weighted basket of currencies managed to improve the current
account balance from -11.8 percent of GDP in 1983 to a low of -1.7 percent in 1984, problems on
the international trading routes intensified when Beira and Nacala routes were completely closed
to Malawi traffic in 1984 (RBM, 2000:np). This forced the country to rely on long overland routes
to the ports of Durban in South Africa and Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, a change which
significantly increased the country's cost of transportation from only 22 percent in the 1970s to
over 40 percent since 1984 (RBM, 2000:np). This worsened the country's terms of trade.
Authorities had to take active exchange rate changes. Thus on April 2, 1985 the Kwacha was
devalued by 15 percent; by 10 percent on August 16, 1986; by 20 percent on February 7, 1987; by
15 percent on 16 January 1988; by 7 percent on 24 March 1990; and twice in 1992, by 15 percent
on March 28 and 22 percent July 11.
On February 7, 1994 the foreign exchange market was completely liberalized and the Kwacha was
allowed to float freely (RBM, 2000:np). Several factors led to this change the first one being the
fundamental disequilibrium as revealed by balance of payments pressures emanating from the
1992/93 drought; the withdrawal of non-humanitarian development assistance by the international
community on account of governance issues; and by the fact that several member countries of the
then Preferential Trade Area (PTA) now COMESA had already adopted various types of market-
determined exchange rates.
The second reason was that, as part of the IMF Structural Adjustment Programmes which started
in 1988, the Malawi government embarked on a three-year adjustment program supported by the
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World Bank's Industrial and Trade Policy Adjustment Credit (ITPAC) and the Agricultural Sector
Adjustment Credit (ASAC). Among other things, this program involved a phased liberalization of
imports that is the removal of restrictions on the approval and availability of foreign exchange for
private sector imports, as well as a move towards adoption of a more flexible and market
determined exchange rate policy. This in the final analysis facilitated the liberalization of the
exchange rate.
3.3.2. Interest Rate Developments in Malawi
Prior to July 1987, the basic structure of interest rates was directly administered by the Reserve
Bank (RBM) of Malawi (RBM, 2000:np). As a result, interest rates were infrequently adjusted
during the period before July 1987. Less attention was paid to underlying macroeconomic
conditions, especially inflation as well as the demand and supply of funds. The main
preoccupation was to keep interest rates low in order to reduce government expenditures and to
promote private investment. During the regime of administered interest rates, deposit rates were
set by Reserve Bank of Malawi while lending rates were set by commercial banks, but subject to a
ceiling rate. In March 1980, however, interest rates which were in favour of the agricultural sector
were introduced for the first time. The sector was given a preferential rate of 1 to 2 percentage
points below the prime rate (RBM, 2000:np).
The deregulation or liberalization of interest rates started in earnest in July 1987 when lending
rates were freed. The Reserve Bank of Malawi advocated for interest rate liberalization and
financial development as growth enhancing economic policies in developing countries based on
the arguments on the theoretical works of Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973 in Sato, 2000:np).
The policy of low interest rates was considered an important avenue for promoting investment by
keeping interest costs low. Mckinnon and Shaw, however, showed that the policy of controlled or
administered interest rates was tantamount to "financial repression", which is a general distortion
in financial prices like interest rates that reduces the real value of financial assets. Thus, the overall
volume of savings decreases and investment is naturally adversely affected. The policy
prescription for the financially repressed economy in the Mckinnon Shaw models is then to raise
institutional interest rates or reduce inflation.
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In line with this thinking and in order to support the adjustment program, it was decided to
gradually deregulate interest rates from 1987 to 1990. Refer to table 1 for specific dates of
deregulation.
Table 1. Liberalisation of Interest Rates in Malawi
Time Deregulation
July 1987 Commercial banks were given the freedom to set
their own lending interest rates.
April 1988 Deposit rates were deregulated
August, 1988 Preferential interest rates to the agricultural sector
were abolished
May 1990 All rates became fully liberalized
Adapted from RBM ( 2000)
Since complete interest rate liberalization was launched, the Bank rate (the rate at which
commercial banks borrow from the Central Bank) has played a more important role in the
financial system. The role of the bank rate has been enhanced by the development of the money
market and the frequent use of open market operations as a tool of monetary policy. The Reserve
Bank of Malawi now uses the Bank Rate as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy. Many
times, the adjustment of the Bank Rate has led to adjustment of interest rates in the financial
system. The Bank rate is set on the basis of interest rates on the treasury bill market as well as
developments in inflation rates.
During the period 1985 to 1990, the bank rate and the savings rate hovered around 10.0 percent
with hardly any changes while the minimum lending rate remained at 13.0 percent. As noted
earlier, the full liberalization of interest rates in 1990 meant that commercial banks could set their
own interest rates. However, in practice during the period 1990 to 1992 the commercial banks
moved their own rates only after the Central Bank moved its bank rate. The bank rate was adjusted
at least seven times by monetary authorities mainly to reduce excess demand for cash, particularly
during the period 1994-1995. This is also the period when Malawi experienced high levels of
inflation. To curb inflationary expectations, the bank rate was raised to 50.0 percent by from end
1994 to May 1995. This was also in line with Treasury Bill (TB) yield which soared during this
period. From 1996, however, the bank rate has been steadily adjusted downwards and currently
stands at 47.0 percent (as of October 1999).
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3.4. Summary
This chapter presented statistics that indicate that Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the
world and Africa. The chapter also noted that economic growth trend was mixed with some years
experiencing high economic growth and some year's negative economic growth. The chapter also
discussed the declining trend in inflation due to good agricultural polices coupled with fiscal
discipline.
The history of monetary policy was discussed in the chapter and it was noted that Malawi uses the
exchange rate and interest rates to achieve monetary targets. In general the Central Bank has
moved from interventionist type of policies to those determined by the market. This was done
through the liberalization of the interest rates and the exchange rates.
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Chapter 4: Analysis of Results
4.1. Introduction
This chapter presents findings of the coding or calculations based on the ranking proposed by
Cukierman et al. (1994). These calculations include legal independence and informal measures of
the independence such as turnover of Central Bank governors and questionnaire for officials of the
Central Bank. The results of the calculations will be compared with values calculated by
Cuikerman et al (1994) using data from other countries. The chapter also presents results of
calculations from the criterion developed by Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2000) which focuses on
transparency and accountability. Lastly, the chapter presents some qualitative findings not
captured by the indices mentioned above and the questionnaire.
4.2. Legal Independence
Chapter 2 (literature review, theory and methodology) discussed the criterion developed by
Cukierman et al (1994) and it was noted that it had sixteen different variables which were divided
into four clusters namely: (a) The chief executive of the Central Bank, which mainly looks at the
appointment and dismissal of the chief executive of the Central Bank (b) the policy formulation
cluster which concerns the resolution of conflict between the executive branch and the Central
Bank as well as the participation of the Central Bank in the budget formulation process (c) the
objectives of the Central Bank, whether price stability is the only objective (d) lending to the
government, whether there are limits on lending to government and the type of limits namely
absolute cash amounts or based on government revenue.
The aggregate score for the Reserve Bank of Malawi's legal independence was found to be 0.50.
This is a very high score compared to those calculated by Cukierman et al. (1994) at both
continental level and the world level. For example the country which Malawi is sharing the same
level of independence at 0.50 is Denmark (refer to table 2 page 35). This score means that the
United States of America, Canada, the Netherlands and United Kingdom have lower levels of
independence than Malawi with scores of 0.48, 0.45, 0.42 and 0.27 respectively (Cukierman et aI.,
1994: 14-15). The score also means that Malawi has the strongest level of independence in Africa
and the only country which almost has the same level of independence is Egypt with a score of
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0.49 (Cukiennan et aI., 1994: 15). This result also means that Malawi has a better score than
countries which are regarded as having more Central Bank independence such as Botswana and
South Africa with scores of 0.33 and 0.25 respectively(Cukiennan et aI., 1994:14-15).These
results are debatable and there are two possible explanations to Malawi's high score.
Firstly the time periods in question are different and difficult to compare. The analysis done by
Cukiennan et aI. (1994) was based on data collected in the period between 1980 and 1989, but
Central Bank independence generated considerable debate in the 1990's (Padayachee, 2001 :745;
Maxfield, 1997: 11). Most of the banks with lower scores in the Cukiennan et al. study could fetch
higher scores than Malawi such as South Africa (whose independence is enshrined in the
constitution) and Botswana if the countries were reanalysed today.
Secondly the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act was being revised at an opportune time i.e. 1989 when
debate on Central Bank independence was widespread, therefore they had an opportunity to
include some aspects that encourage Central Bank independence. Other countries didn't have this
opportunity since their charters were developed earlier than this. For example, South Africa was
using South African Reserve Bank Act of 1944 which was later replaced by South African
Reserve Bank Act, No 90 of 1989 and the 1996 constitution (Reserve Bank of South Africa,
2007:np). During this period Botswana was using the Bank of Botswana Act, 1975 (Central Bank
of Botswana, 2008:np).
Table 2. Indices of Central Bank Independence
Country LCBI Index Turnover f Questionnaire
Governors
Denmark 0.50 (1) 0.05 (1) 0.73 (1)
Malawi 0.50 (2) 0.21 (7) 0.73 (1)
United States of 0.48 (3) 0.13(6) -
America
Canada 0.45 (4) 0.10 (3) -
Netherlands 0.42 (5) 0.05 (1) -
Botswana 0.33 (6) 0.41 (8) -
United Kingdom 0.27 (7) 0.10(3) 0.64 (2)
South Africa 0.25 (8) 0.10 (3) 0.64 (2)
Adapted from Cukierman et at. (1994) and own calculahons
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Even though the Reserve Bank of Malawi has got a high score, there are some factors in the
Reserve Bank of Malawi Act that need attention. First the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act is weak on
the Central Bank objectives cluster. As noted in chapter two, when the Central Bank charter
specifies price stability as the main or only goal, the bank is classified as being more independent
than a Central Bank with several objectives in addition to and sometimes not consistent with price
stability such as full employment (Cukierman et aI., 1994: 14-15) . The Reserve Bank of Malawi
gets a score of 6% under this cluster. The low score is because the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act
1989 does not specifically mention price stability as its main objective. The list of objectives of
the Reserve Bank of Malawi according to the Act is stated as follows:
... to issue legal tender currency in Malawi; to act as banker and adviser to the
Government; to maintain external reserves so as to safeguard the inter- national value of
the Malawi currency; to implement measures designed to influence the money supply and
the availability of credit, interest rates and exchange rates with the view to promoting
economic growth, employment, stability in prices and a sustainable balance ofpayments
position; to promote a sound financial structure in Malawi, including payment systems,
clearing systems and adequate financial services; to promote a money and capital market
in Malawi; to act as lender of last resort to the banking system; to supervise banks and
other finanCial institutions; to collect economic data ofthe financial and other sectors for
research and policy purposes; and to promote development in Malawi. (Reserve Bank of
Malawi Act, Part Ill: Section 4).
The act does not provide a clear ranking of the objectives and it is becomes difficult to evaluate
the Central Banks performance. The situation is even worsened by having two conflicting
objectives at least in the short run. There has been some debate as to the compatibility between the
objective of price stability and unemployment (Padayachee, 2001:47). Economists predict that
through the Philips curve there is a trade off between inflation rate and unemployment i.e. low
inflation rates lead to high unemployment and vice versa in the short run. Recently there has been
some consensus as to the importance of price stability and that the trade off disappears at least in
the long run. In the short run this conflict could be resolved by making price stability the only
objective of the Central Bank (Cukierman et aI., 1994:10).
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The other aspect where the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act is weak is the monetary policy
formulation cluster. Cukierman et al. (1994) predict that those Central Banks with greater freedom
and latitude in the formulation of monetary policy are more independent than those that do not
have the freedom. They also predict that if the Central Bank conducts monetary policy alone
without consulting government is more independent than those Central Banks that have no say on
monetary policy. The researcher's calculations following the Cukierman et al. (1994) criteria the
Reserve Bank of Malawi scored 0.07 out of 0.45 which is just above 15% under this cluster. Even
though the Act does not specifically state that the Government should be involved in the
formulation of monetary policy, there are many sections of the act which state that the Central
Bank should consult government on monetary policy operations. For example, Part VIII Division
11 Sections 40 and 41 of the Act state that:
"Ifat any time the Bank has any Government loans and advances outstanding, irrespective of
maturity, the Bank may require the Government to issue to it treasury bills or promissory notes
and other instruments as the Bank may deem fit for open market policy purposes, and the terms
and conditions shall be agreed upon between the Bank and the Minister. " (Reserve Bank of
Malawi Act 1989, Part VIIL Division II section 40).
"The Bank shall be entrusted with the issue and management of Government securities
publicly issued in Malawi upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between
the Minister and the Bank." (Reserve Bank of Malawi Act 1989,Part VIIL Division II
section 41)
The other important factor under this cluster according to Cukierman et al. (1994) is the provisions
made to resolve conflicts about monetary policy between government and the Central Bank. The
Reserve Bank of Malawi Act has weakness in that it does not clearly state who has the final
authority as far as conflicts on monetary policy are concerned. Cukierman et al.(1994) argue that
those Central Banks that have the final authority or the final say on issues that are clearly defined
in the laws as its objectives have the greatest level of independence than those where the
executive branch has unconditional priority on policy decisions. Therefore the Reserve Bank of
Malawi is weak on this aspect.
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One of the clusters that also contributes to the overall low score in Central Bank independence is
the chief executive cluster. The Reserve Bank of Malawi scored 0.2 out of the possible 0.8
representing a percentage of 25%. This weakness stems from the fact that the executive branch is
very influential and not transparent in the appointment or the dismissal of the Central Bank
governor. For example, according to the Reserve Bank Act the President is responsible for the
appointment of the Reserve Bank of Malawi Governor for a period of 5 years using an instrument
of appointment stating conditions of service for the Governor and yet these conditions are not
stated in the Act. The Act only stipulates that the conditions in the instrument shall not be changed
to the disadvantage of the Governor during his term of office (RBM Act 1989, Part V Section 12
(1-3).
The second weakness is that the Act allows the Governor to hold other positions apart from the
one at the Central Bank as long as the executive branch approves (RBM Act 1989 Part V Section
12 (4). Central Banks that are very independent do not allow the chief executive of the Central
Bank to hold other offices more especially in government to avoid conflict of interest and to
ensure that the governor is devoted fully to the running of the Central Bank. The current Governor
of the Reserve Bank of Malawi owns and runs a four star hotel which is also allowed to buy and
sell foreign exchange at a small scale. However there is a strong point that he was made to resign
from being the Chairman of the Board of Malawi Rural Development Fund (MARDEF) a
government organization responsible for disbursing micro loans, soon after his appointment.
The last weakness under this cluster is that the term of office of the Central Bank is short (the term
of office is five years). Cukierman et al. (1994) argues that Central Bank independence is at its
strongest when the term of office of the chief executive is longer than eight years (Cukierman et
aI., 1994:9). Care should be taken when interpreting this since governors who are subservient to
the government may end up staying on as governor for a longer period of time.
On lending to government there are eight variables that form the cluster. As already noted in
chapter two the cluster tries to show how tight the rules are for lending to the public sector.
Theoretically according to Cukierman et al. (1994: 10-11) Central Banks that have the highest level
of independence do not provide advances to the government and the least independent provide
advances with no conditions attached. The other assumption is that Central Bank independence is
at its strongest when it is not involved in securitized lending, followed by those that lend to
government but with stricter rules and lastly those with no rules at all. The overall score after our
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calculations of the variables under this cluster is 2.57 out of the possible 8 representing 32 percent.
There are several reasons for the bad score.
Firstly, even though there are rules that limit government from borrowing from the Central Bank,
there are some weaknesses in the Act pertaining to the repayment. The government is not
supposed to borrow over 20% of its annual budgeted revenues, and that the government is
supposed to repay within the last four months of the end of the government financial year (Reserve
Bank of Malawi Act, Part VIII, Division 11, section 40(5)). The law is problematic because it gives
government leeway, if at the end of the year there are advances outstanding, to issue treasury bills
or promissory notes or other instruments the bank may see fit for open market operations. The law
gives government an opportunity to delay the payment of the advances in order to rollover the debt
through market operations to the other year.
Another weakness under this cluster is securitized lending. The Reserve Bank of Malawi falls in
the category of those which allow securitized lending but with limits that could be described as
weak since they can be negotiated between the Minister of Finance and the Reserve Bank
Governor, the act states that:
The Bank may purchase and sell securities ofthe Government maturing in not more
than twenty-five years which have been publicly offered for sale or form part ofan
issue which is being made to the public at the time ofacquisition: Provided that at
any particular date the total amount ofsuch securities ofa maturity exceeding two
years in the ownership ofthe Bank... shall not together at any time exceed twenty
per cent or such lower percentage as the Minister, after consulting the Governor,
may from time to time determine by order published in the Gazette, of the total
development budget of the Government for the current fiscal year. (Reserve Bank
of Malawi Act, Part VIII, Division 11, section 40(5).
The other weakness under the same cluster is on how limits are set for lending, whether they are
on currency amounts (nominal), Central Bank demand liabilities or capital, government revenue or
government expenditures. Ideally if the Central Bank sets its limitations based on currency
amounts the Central Bank is considered highly independent but just lower than those that do not
lend to the government at all (Cukierman et al. (1994). Those Central Banks that set their limits on
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lending to the government based on the government's expenditure are considered very weak while
those that set their limits based on absolute cash amounts are considered stronger. On this aspect
the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act 1989 is weak because it stipulates that the total amount of
advances outstanding at any time made by the bank shall not exceed twenty per cent of the annual
budgeted revenues of the government where budgeted revenue means all those revenues derived
from sources within Malawi as estimated for the government's financial year in which such
advances are made.
4.3 Informal Indicators of Actual Independence
4.3.1 Turnover of Central Bank Governors
The turnover of Central Bank Governors is based on the assumption that at least above some
threshold rapid changes of Central Bank governors indicate a lower level of independence
(Cukierman et aI., 1994: 13). It assumes that frequent turnovers accord politicians the opportunity
to choose governors who are subservient to the government. Rapid turnover may also indicate that
the government is firing the governors who challenge its wishes. If the tenure of the governor
drops to about 0.2 or 0.25 per year it means that the independence of the Central Bank is under
threat. These threshold figures translate to a term of office of about four to five years (Cukierman
et aI., 1994: 13). Care should be taken in interpreting these results because low turnover sometimes
may also mean lower independence of the Central Bank. Relatively subservient governors may
stay in the position a longer time if they do what the politicians want them to do.
In the Malawi case, the Reserve Bank of Malawi has had 10 governors since its inception in 1965
but there is no indication that there was a Governor between 1965 and 1967(Reserve Bank of
Malawi, 2008: np). The average term of the Central Bank governor since independence is
approximately 4.7 (.21 per year) years which is almost equal to the length of the political cycle (5
years). The longest serving governor of the Reserve Bank of Malawi was Mr. John Tembo who
served as governor from 1971 to 1984 during the period of one party rule. The shortest serving
governor of the Reserve Bank of Malawi is A.G. Perrin who was the first Reserve Bank of Malawi
Governor, only served for one year in 1968. An examination of the rate of turnover of Reserve
Bank of Malawi Governors after the advent of multiparty democracy (Referendum was in 1993
and general elections were held in 1994) indicates a drop to 4.5 years on average.
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The most interesting pattern discovered is that there is a change in the Reserve Bank of Malawi
Governor a year after every general election in the multiparty era. For example, Or. Chikaonda
replaced Mr. Perekamoyo as governor in 1995 soon after the 1994 elections. Similarly Or.
Ngalande in 2000 soon after the 1999 elections. The last occurrence is when Mr. Victor Mbewe
replaced Or. Ngalande in 2005 soon after the 2004 elections.
The most interesting change in the Central Bank governor is the latest case where Mr. Victor
Mbewe replaced Or. Ngalande. During the 2004 elections Dr. Bingu wamutharika was hand
picked by the outgoing President Or. Bakili Muluzi from outside the ruling party UOF. The
elections were won by the ruling party and Dr. Bingu wa Mutharika became president. But in late
2004 he declared himself independent and formed his own party in 2005. The reason given was
that the ruling party was opposing his no-tolerance stance on corruption. Early February, 2005
government announced that the current governor's contract was expired and will be replaced by
Mr. Mbewe, no reason was given for the change. The quotation below extracted from the Central
Banking Publications Limited website in the UK gives a good picture of what happened.
President Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi has decided against renewing the contract of
Elias Ngalande, the Central Bank governor, whose term expires at the end ofthis month, a
government official said on February 1. Reuters reported that no explanation was given
for the decision. Ngalande is to be succeeded by Victor Mbewe, a former head of the
Malawi operations for South Africa's Standard Bank, the report said. "The president has
decided to replace Dr Ngalande with Victor Mbewe and has not given any reason for
doing so," Charles Matabwa, the chief secretary for the civil service, told state radio
according to Reuters.
(Central Banking Publications Limited, 2005)
Comparing this score (.21 changes in a year) to the scores calculated by Cukierman et al. in his
1994 study, one finds that the score by the Reserve Bank of Malawi is weak if compared to the
industrialised countries which have scores less than 0.2 changes in a year (see table 2 page 37 for
selected scores from Cukierman et al. 1994). Comparing the score of Reserve Bank of Malawi
with other developing countries one sees that the score is stronger because it is below the
maximum of .25 turnovers a year when more than half of the developing countries have turnover
rates exceeding the maximum. Even though Malawi has got a better score than most of African
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countries it does not mean that the Central Bank is more independent. The period where one finds
the longest serving Central Bank governor was characterised by dictatorship and Central Banks
dependence (this was during the J.Z.U. Tembo era from 1971 to 1984). One could conclude that
the governor served the longest because he was subservient to the government of the day.
Comparing specifically with South Africa we see the score by the Reserve Bank of Malawi of an
average period service of 4.7 years, is beaten by a big margin. South Africa had an average of 8
yrs in office during the period between 1921 and 2001 (Parsons, 2005: 10). Despite the fact that
both South Africa and Malawi have got the same influence of the Bank of England in their
histories.
4.3.2. Questionnaire on Central Bank Independence
To compliment the legal indicator for Central Bank independence and informal indicator of
turnover of Central Bank governors, a questionnaire was sent to senior officials of the Reserve
Bank of Malawi to see how they rate themselves on Central Bank independence. The
questionnaire was divided into seven parts each part depicting a certain aspect of Reserve Bank of
Malawi. The questionnaire contains the same questions and variables that were dealt with when
measuring legal independence. However some parts of the questionnaire focus on the situation on
ground other than the law.
Aggregating the scores one finds that the Reserve Bank of Malawi independence increases from
0.5 as indicated by legal independence to 0.73. This is a very high score and once again equal to
that of Denmark and still above South Africa with 0.64 and other African countries whose
independence is regarded as very high (refer to table 2 page 35for more scores). The major reason
once again is the differences in the times under comparison. This research has been conducted at a
time when there are many improvements in the area of monetary policy as compared to the
1980's, the time periods used by the study done by Cukierman et a1.(1994). If the study was
expanded to include other African countries such as South Africa one would possibly get scores
far much better than those by Cukierman et a1. (1994) and higher than the Malawian score.
The first variable under the questionnaire deals with the extent to which the terms of office of the
governor are independent from those of the government. The more the turnover at the Central
Bank coincides with the turnover in government, the less independent the Central Bank is likely to
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be. In line with the findings under the informal indicator of turnover of governors above where the
governor is changed almost after elections, the Reserve Bank of Malawi officials indicated that
there is some overlap between the two and this undermines the Central Bank's independence.
The second variable deals with limitations on lending and it was coded by applying the same
criteria as in legal independence in the literature review theory and methodology and above. In the
legal measurement of Central Bank independent it was found out that there are some limitations
but they are moderately loose. The monetary specialists through the questionnaire indicated that
the rules are loose and at times nonexistent. What this means is that even though there are some
rules limiting lending in the Reserve Bank Act, in practice the rules are undermined thereby
reducing Central Bank independence.
The next variable focuses on the resolution of conflict between the executive branch and the
Central Bank. Where as the Reserve Bank Act 1989 does not really specify the way conflicts
should be resolved, the monetary specialists indicated that there are several clear cases where
resolution of the conflicts ends in favour of the Central Bank. There is no clear way as to how
conflicts are resolved. The Central Bank officials indicated that there are discussions between the
bank and government before a policy stance is taken and implemented. To be specific, officials
from the Ministry of Finance and representatives from the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of
Economic Planning are in attendance at the monetary policy committee meetings where decisions
about policy are held.
Variable number four focuses on whether the bank has got financial independence or not by
looking at the involvement of the executive in the formulation of the bank's budget and the
formulation of salaries of high bank officials. The Central Bankers indicated that the determination
of the Reserve Bank of Malawi's budget is mostly done by the Central Bankers, but the
determination of salaries of high ranking bank officials is done jointly by the Central Bank and the
government. They indicated that they are rarely involved in the formulation of the government
budget. The Reserve Bank of Malawi Act is also silent on the involvement of the Central Bank in
government budget formulation.
Variable number five reflects the relative importance of monetary targets for the monetary stock or
interest rates as pre-commitments with government. The theory behind it is that money stock
targets enable the pursuit of price stability because the bank could adhere to them in the face of
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pressure from the government. A target for the nominal interest generally would work to limit the
ability of the bank to react to upsurges of inflation. The Reserve Bank of Malawi, according to the
responses from the questionnaire targets quantitative monetary stocks and these targets are usually
met but the bank does not target formal or informal interest rates.
The sixth variable tests the commitment of the bank to fighting inflation rate. On this variable the
Central Bankers in Malawi indicated that they are committed to controlling inflation rate despite
the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act not clearly stating whether the inflation rate is the priority of the
bank. The Act lists ten objectives which include price stability and these objectives are not ranked
according to priority.
The final variable deals with whether the Central Bank acts as a development bank. Theory
predicts that a bank that is very independent is not supposed to involve itself in issues of
development such as granting of loans at subsidized rates. The Reserve Bank of Malawi after
partial liberalization stopped granting of loans at subsidized credit in 1988 (Reserve Bank of
Malawi, 2000: np). Therefore the bank does not act as a development bank even though it has
development as one of its main objectives officially.
4.4. Accountability and Transparency
As noted in the theory and methodology chapter under accountability and transparency the project
used the criteria developed by Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2000) to check whether the Reserve
Bank of Malawi is accountable to the powers accorded to it. They pose 13 different questions and
the total number of positive answers determines the score for the Central Bank concerned (each
question carries a mark of 1 if a certain aspect is present and zero if absent, Refer to annex three
page 65). The questions are grouped into three different clusters namely objectives of monetary
policy, transparency and final responsibility.
Under accountability and transparency, the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act gets an aggregate score
of four out of thirteen points which translates to 30.7%. The reason behind the poor score is that
the debate about accountability and transparency started to take shape after 1989 when the Reserve
Bank of Malawi was revised. The Act therefore does not reflect trends of good governance such as
transparency and accountability. Although there are some mechanisms in place to deal with
accountability and transparency the act does only mentions the bare minimum compared to the
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transparency III practice. Comparing with other Central Banks in developed countries, the
aggregate score shows that Reserve Bank of Malawi is more transparent than the European Central
Bank according to the results by Eijffinger and Hoeberichts (2000). The European Central Bank
scored a total of four points out of thirteen (refer to annexe four for more results). According to the
same study, the Central Bank that has got the best accountability and transparency mechanisms is
the Bank of England with eleven points out of thirteen (Eijffinger & Hoeberichts, 2000:9).
The first section of the questionnaire deals with the objectives of the Central Bank. This is
necessary because the objectives are taken as yardsticks to measure performance of the Central
Bank for accountability purpose (Eijffinger & Hoeberichts, 2000: 1-2). The cluster also looks at
whether there are several objectives and if anything there is a ranking of the objectives. The
cluster assesses whether the objectives are clearly quantified making it easier to measure
performance of the bank. Under this cluster the Reserve Bank of Malawi did not do well because
the final score is one point out of four. The Reserve Bank of Malawi Act specifies ten objectives
of the bank but these objectives are not clearly defined nor are they clearly ranked. The objectives
are broadly defined and not quantified. For example, the Act states that one of the objectives of
the Reserve Bank of Malawi is to maintain price stability but does not specify at what levels
(Reserve Bank of Malawi Act, Part Ill: Section 4). This becomes a problem when one wants to
evaluate the performance of the Bank because there no benchmarks for assessment.
The second cluster of this criteria focuses on the transparency of monetary policy. This involves
finding out whether the Central Bank publishes other reports such as inflation reports or monetary
reports apart from the mandated Central Bank reports. This cluster also looks at whether
resolutions of the governing board are made public in good time and whether the Central Bank
explains how it reached a specific conclusion. The Reserve Bank of Malawi under this cluster gets
a score of 2 out of 3 points. Firstly, the bank publishes other reports apart from those mandated by
the Act such as annual financial accounts, yearly reports on its operations and a return of its assets
and liabilities (RBM Act, Part X Section 52, 1-6). The additional reports include monthly,
quarterly, mid-year and yearly economic reviews which are also put on the Central Banks website
(RBM,2008:np).
Another question this cluster poses is whether the governing board releases its results for public
consumption in good time. The Reserve Bank of Malawi Act allows the Board, condition to the
approval of the Minister, to make by-laws for the administration and management of the Bank and
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these laws are published in the government gazette. Whether the resolutions are published in the
gazette in time is difficult to measure. The last variable in this cluster evaluates whether the
Central Bank explains publicly the extent it has been able to reach its objectives. The Reserve
Bank of Malawi through its minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meetings explains the
extent the bank has achieved its objectives. The minutes also explain why the bank has taken a
certain policy stance but does not include the voting patterns.
The last cluster deals with the issue of who has the last responsibility of monetary policy and
whether there are avenues that are used to address disputes between the bank and the government.
This cluster also looks at whether the Central Bank is subject to monitoring by Parliament. Under
this cluster the Reserve Bank of Malawi has a very poor score of two out of six. The Reserve Bank
of Malawi collects a point as it is subject to monitoring by parliament. The Central Bank is
supposed to come up with a copy of audited annual accounts and a report of its operations in the
year which are submitted to the minister of finance who forwards the reports to parliament for
discussion (Reserve Bank of Malawi Act 1989, Part X section 52). The governor however is not
obliged to attend parliament to answer questions on monetary policy.
Another set of questions this cluster looks at is whether past performance is a ground for dismissal
of a Central Bank governor and how the government and the Central Bank handle conflicts. The
act is silent on how conflicts are handled and there is no mention of an override mechanism. It was
noted during the interviews that the Reserve Bank of Malawi and the government decide on
monetary policy jointly and that in cases of conflict there are clear cases where the Central Bank
has won. Using past performance as a determinant in terminating the governor, the Reserve Bank
of Malawi Act is silent even though it mentions that the conditions of employment of the governor
are stipulated in the instrument of appointment which is not made public.
4.5. Issues not Captured by All Other Indices
Apart from these quantitative indicators the project also looked at some qualitative factors. Firstly
the size, composition and duties of the Reserve Bank of Malawi Board of Directors will be
discussed. The Reserve Bank of Malawi has a board of directors consisting of seven members
who have the responsibility of implementing the administrative and management policy of the
bank. The Act stipulates that the Board should consist of the governor, deputy governor and five
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other directors (appointed by the president for a period oftwo years) who may include secretary to
the treasury, secretary for economic planning and development and the accountant general.
Currently, the board is composed of six members namely, the governor, deputy governor,
secretary to the treasury, two members from the business community and one member from the
academia. The governor acts as the chairman of the board.
The act also requires every director to be a person of recognized standing and experience in
business, management, profession or academics. The Reserve Bank of Malawi board, using
Parson's terminology (Parson, 2005: 17), could be described primarily as an oversight board since
the responsibility of monetary policy is delegated to the Monetary Policy Committee and board
meetings are not necessarily taken as the main source of effective decisions regarding monetary
policy. However this set up, according to some economists, creates a dilemma as the governor
being the chairman of the board, tends to oversee himself (Parsons, 2005: 17). As one of the
solutions and to allow for good corporate governance, economists argue that there is a need to
create two posts, one for board chairman and one for Reserve Bank of Malawi Governor who
chairs the monetary policy committee.
On subcommittee work the research found out that Reserve Bank of Malawi has fifteen
departments some of them are general counsel, human resources, research and statistics,
supervision of financial institutions and corporate services. If the board of directors has specific
requirements, the job is handed over to a department that specializes in that area for feedback
thereby avoiding the task of formulating a subcommittee for that problem. In addition to this, the
board always receives reports and position papers monthly from various departments informing
the board of the major developments in their departments. However there are some situations
when a consultant is contracted to do a certain job which requires certain skills the bank does not
have and the findings are communicated to the board of directors in a form of a report. For
example the bank employed a consultant to look at how the bank could reform itself and
streamline some of its functions between 2005 and 2006.
The research also found out that the Monetary Policy Committee in the Reserve Bank of Malawi
consisted of the Governor, Deputy Governor, the General Manager, the Secretary to the Treasury,
Principal Secretary in Economic Planning and Development and one member from the academia.
During their meetings, which take place once in every two months, the executive directors for
economic services, corporate services and supervision of banks are in attendance in non-voting
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capacity. Just as the board of directors, the Monetary Policy Committee is provided with reports,
position papers and research papers from various relevant departments more for its decision
making purposes more. The reports are mainly from the research and statistics, supervision of
financial institutions and corporate services departments. The Monetary Policy Committee
normally decides on its targets for the whole year in January which are reviewed after six months
but the targets are monitored quarterly. The Reserve Bank of Malawi mainly targets reserve
money and the major instruments are the credit market and foreign assets. Reserve money is
targeted because it is easier to use and has immediate impact and control on deposits by
commercial banks and price of money, namely interest rates.
The size and characteristics of the Reserve Bank Monetary Policy committee are just in line with
other findings from Berger et al. (2006). Berger et al. (2006) discovered that on average Monetary
Policy Committees range from five to ten people. The case studies also noted that the size of the
committee is decided by the size of the country, the economic development and the political
situation. The monetary policy committee of the Reserve Bank is small due to the fact that the
economy is underdeveloped, very small, and predominantly agricultural with little heterogeneity.
The political system is democratic in nature therefore not requiring a big monetary policy
committee to insulate it from political influence.
On the composition of the Monetary Policy Committee there are some issues that could be subject
to debate. The first issue is whether the members of the Monetary Policy Committee are
sufficiently independent enough given the fact that the government is present at the meetings. The
answer is both yes and no depending on the angle you are looking at. For example, Amtenbrink
(2004: 15-17) argues that there is need for coordination between fiscal policy and monetary policy
in an economy and the Monetary Policy Committee provides the perfect platform for this. He
proposes the presence of government in the monetary policy committee as it helps the government
to communicate the general economic situation to the bank. He argues further that government's
representation at the board will work to the advantage of the bank as it provides an opportunity for
them to explain and motivate the approach to monetary policy to the government. What IS
apparent in the Malawian case is that disagreements over policy are rarely noticed and it IS
difficult to discern where sources of influence in a decision come from since the voting patterns
are not shown in the minutes of Monetary Policy Committee meetings.
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The other question that might be raised is whether concerns of the employees of the bank that
attend the monetary policy committee in non voting capacity are taken into account. Are these
members able to influence policy or advise the committee on issues that could potentially
contradict the position of the governor as their boss? These issues are also well concealed in the
minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meetings. The other issue that can be raised touches
on the question of the qualifications and variety of the members of the Monetary Policy
Committee. Most of the members of the Monetary Policy Committee in non-voting capacity are
officials of the bank namely directors of various departments. Parson noted that the success of the
Bank of England has been attributed to the quality of its policy makers, the knowledge of how the
economy works more especially the involvement of outside expertise in the Monetary Policy
Committee (Parsons, 2005: 19). This is an issue that needs to be considered to widen the range of
expertise and knowledge in the committee.
The last issue is deals with the conditions of appointment of the governor and who bares the final
responsibility of the monetary policy. Earlier in the chapter we noted that the Reserve Bank of
Malawi Act allows the president to appoint the Reserve Bank of Malawi Governor for a period of
5 years using an instrument of appointment stating conditions of service for the governor and that
these conditions are not stipulated in the Act. One would argue that the conditions of employment
for the governor should be made public for transparency sake more especially when it comes to
termination of the contract due to non-performance. This becomes important as government also
takes part in monetary policy formulation and one could only speculate as who would bare the
final responsibility if the Central Bank fails to meet its targets. These are questions that could be
addressed or looked into during the setup of the Reserve Bank of Malawi governance structure, let
alone the Act.
4.6. Summary
This chapter has discussed several aspects of the Reserve Bank of Malawi. These included the
legal measure of central independence, informal measures of Central Bank independence namely
turnover of Central Bank governors, and a questionnaire based index. The Research discovered
that even though the score for legal Central Bank independence index was higher than some
developed countries and most of the developing countries, the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act 1989
has several weaknesses that need to be looked into. The research also found that it is difficult to
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compare the results of this research to those calculated by Cukierman et al. (1994) since the time
periods are different and that some Central Bank charters used in the Cukierman et al. study were
relatively old.
The research also found that the informal indicator that focuses on the turnover of central
governors increases the independence of the Reserve Bank of Malawi as compared to the legal
index. The research discovered that even though the results were lower than those from developed
countries, Malawi did well on the Africa level as the turnover of the governor at the Reserve Bank
of Malawi was lower than average. However the research noted that there is some overlap
between the political cycle and the turnover of Central Bank governors more especially during the
multiparty era therefore threatening the Central Bank independence.
The questionnaire of Central Bank independence came up with a score which was higher than
some Industrial countries. The indicator also means that on Africa Level, the Reserve Bank
Malawi is one of the most independent Central Banks in Africa. This result just like that of legal
independence had the weakness that comparison with other countries was difficult since the times
of being compared are different. This research has been conducted at a time when there are many
improvements in the area of monetary policy as compared to the 1980s, the time period used by
the study done by Cukierman et al. (1994). If the study was expanded now to include other
African countries such as South Africa one would surely get scores far much better than those by
Cukierman et al. (1994) and higher than the Malawian score.
The chapter also discussed issues that deal with accountability and transparency. The Research
noted that the Reserve Bank of Malawi even though with a weak score, performs better than other
banks in the developed countries. For example the Reserve Bank of Malawi is more transparent
than the European Central Bank according to the results by Eijffinger & Hoeberichts (2000).
According to the same study the bank that has got the best accountability and transparency
mechanisms is the Bank of England.
Looking at other factors not covered by the indices mentioned above, the research found out that
the Reserve Bank of Malawi has a board of directors consisting of seven members who have the
responsibility of implementing the administrative and management policy of the bank. The board
costs of the governor, deputy governor and five other directors (appointed by the president for a
period of two years) who may include secretary to the treasury, secretary for economic planning
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and development and the accountant general. The research also found out that the Reserve Bank of
Malawi has a Monetary Policy Committee which consists of the Governor, deputy Governor, the
General Manager, the Secretary to the Treasury, Principal Secretary in Economic Planning and
Development and one member from the academia.
There is a need to create a new post of Chairman of the Reserve Bank of Malawi board because
the current setup means that the Governor oversees himself. In addition there is a need to include
outside members who have experience in different fields.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
The purpose of the dissertation was to measure using appropriate methodology the degree of
independence of the Reserve Bank of Malawi based on the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act of 1989.
Furthermore the dissertation assessed the vulnerability of this independence in the context of good
governance and a variety of internal and external threats on the independence. This was achieved
by using formal and informal measures of central bank independence developed by Cukierman et
al (1994). The main instrument used in the determination of Reserve Bank of Malawi
independence was legal independence which is based on the coding of the central bank charter and
is based on the degree of independence conferred to the central bank by law. But this measure has
a weakness that most central banks do not adhere to the laws in practice.
To address this limitation, the informal indicator looking at the turnover of governors and a
questionnaire were used to make up for the weakness. Turnover of central bank governors is used
on the presumption that at least above some threshold more rapid turnover of governors indicates a
lower level of independence. On good governance the study used the criteria developed by
Eijffinger & Hoeberichts (2000) that deals with accountability and transparency. The criterion has
thirteen components which are given a score of one each. The thirteen components are divided
into three main themes to do with accountability and transparency.
The main weakness of the study is that it is difficult to compare the results those by Cukierman et
al. (1994) since the time periods in question are different and difficult to compare since central
banking is dynamic. The analysis done by Cukierman et al. (1994) was based on data collected in
the period between 1980 and 1989 but central bank independence generated considerable debate in
the 1990's (Padayachee, 2001:745; Maxfield, 1997:11). The analysis has been done using data
that is as late as 2006. The incomparability of the time periods should be kept in mind when
interpreting the results.
The aggregate score for the Reserve Bank of Malawi's independence under legal independence as
calculated by the researcher was found to be 0.50. This is a very high score if we compare with the
results found by Cukierman et al. (1994). Despite having a high score the Reserve Bank of Malawi
act still has some weaknesses in four areas namely: (a) The chief executive of the central bank
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cluster, (b) the policy fonnulation cluster (c) the objectives of the central bank and (d) lending to
the government.
On the infonnal indicator of turnover of central bank governors, even though the results are higher
than the average at Africa level, there are some weaknesses which need to be noted. There is some
overlap between the political cycle and the turnover of central bank governors which compromises
central bank independence. It was also noted that during the multiparty era in Malawi, a new
governor is appointed a year after general elections. This in essence indicates that there is a lot of
political interference on Reserve Bank of Malawi independence.
Under accountability and transparency the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act 1989 gets an aggregate
score of 5 out of 13 points which translates to 38.4%. The reason behind the poor score is that the
debate about accountability and transparency started to take shape after 1989 when the Reserve
Bank of Malawi act was being fonnulated. This means that the debate on accountability and
transparency was rife after the act was already published. Even though there are some mechanisms
in place to deal with accountability and transparency, the act does not mention this even though
there is a lot of transparency on the ground.
The Reserve Bank of Malawi board could be described primarily as an oversight board since the
responsibility of monetary policy is delegated to the Monetary Policy Committee and board
meetings are not necessarily taken as the main source of effective decisions regarding monetary
policy. However this set up, according to some economists, creates a dilemma as the governor
being the chainnan of the board tends to oversee himself and this usually leads to diminished
accountability and transparency (Parsons, 2005: 17).
The qualifications and variety of the members of the Monetary Policy Committee. Most of the
members of the Monetary Policy Committee in non-voting capacity are officials of the bank
namely directors of various departments. Parson noted that the success of the Bank of England has
been attributed to the quality of its policy makers, the knowledge of how the economy works more
especially the involvement of outside expertise in the Monetary Policy Committee (Parsons,
2005: 19). This is an issue that needs to be considered to widen the range of expertise and
knowledge in the committee.
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Finally the conditions of appointment of the governor and who bares the final responsibility of the
monetary policy were assessed. Earlier in the chapter we noted that the Reserve Bank of Malawi
Act allows the president to appoint the Reserve Bank of Malawi Governor for a period of 5 years
using an instrument of appointment stating conditions of service for the governor and that these
conditions are not stipulated in the Act. This becomes important as government also takes part in
monetary policy formulation and one could only speculate as who would bare the final
responsibility (who would shoulder the blame) if the central bank fails to meet its targets.
Recommendations
In view of the findings summarised above the research would like to recommend that the Reserve
Bank of Malawi act of 1989 should be revised to include issues of independence accountability
and transparency. First of all the act should be clear on the terms and conditions of the Reserve
Bank of Malawi Governor since the instrument of appointment of appointment is not made public.
This may include whether the contract of the governor could be terminated after he fails to meet a
certain given target. Apart from bringing in transparency, this would reduce the firing of Reserve
Bank of Malawi governor on political grounds.
Secondly during the review of the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act is to improve the objectives
should be taken into account. As noted in the analysis of results, the Reserve Bank of Malawi has
ten objectives and there is no clear prioritisation of the objectives. One way of dealing with this is
to make price stability their sole target since in practice, as noted by the questionnaire on central
bank independence, price stability is taken as priority. If this is not possible, the government
should consider prioritising the objectives to make assessment of the central bank's performance
easier and transparent.
Furthermore there is need for clear and precise mechanisms that deal with conflict resolution. As
noted in the previous chapter the Reserve Bank Act does not spell out the way conflicts should be
resolved. Even though Officials of the Reserve Bank of Malawi indicated that there are several
clear cases where resolution of the conflicts ended in favor of the central bank, there is no clear
indication on how conflicts are resolved. This mechanism is needed to improve the transparency
of the central bank.
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Lastly when the Reserve Bank of Malawi Act was being revised, there was little debate on issues
of governance more especially on accountability and transparency of monetary policy. Even
though the Reserve Bank of Malawi has several ways of communicating monetary policy to the
government and the public at large there is a need to formalize these avenues to make them a
requirement in the act. Formalizing these avenues would ensure accountability and transparency
of the bank through the provision of information to the public.
55
References
Alesina, A. 1989. Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies, Economic Policy, 4
(8):55-98.
Arnone, M., Laurens, B., Segalotto, J. and Sommer, M. 2007. Central Bank Autonomy: Lessons
from Global Trends, International Monetary Fund Working Paper number WP/07/88
Arnone, M., Laurens, B. and Segalotto, J. 2006. The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy:
Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence, International Monetary Fund Working
Paper number WP/06/277
Amtenbrink, F. 2004. The Three Pillars of Central Bank Governance - Towards a Model Central
Bank Law or a Code of Good Governance? IMF LEG Workshop on Central Banking, and IMF
LEG and IMF Institute Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, 2004.
Berger, H. Nitsch, V. and Lybek, T. 2007. Central Bank Boards around the World: Why does
Membership Size Differ? CESifo Working Paper Series. CESifo GmbH.
Bank of Botswana. 2008. Bank of Botswana Act http://www.bankofbotswana.bw/
sections.php?sectid=503 (accessed on 30 April, 2008)
Bryant, C. 1996. Central Bank Independence, Fiscal Responsibility, and the Goals of the
Macroeconomic Policy: an American Perspective on the New Zealand Experience. Brookings
Discussion Paper in International Economics, No.126 Brooking Institution, Washington.
Central Banking. 2005. New Central Bank Governor for Malawi. Central Banking Publications
Limited, United Kingdom. http://www.centralbanking.co.uk/newsmakers/
archive/2005/march7.htm#26 (accessed on 28 April, 2008)
Cukierman, A., Web, S., and Neyapti, B. 1994. "Measuring Central Bank Independence and Its
Effect on Policy Outcomes." International Center for Economic Growth Occasional Paper No.
58:1-62.
56
Cukiennan, A., Web, S., and Neyapti, B. 1994. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and
Independence: Theory and Evidence. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
De Haan, J., Amtenbrink, F, and. Eijffinger, S.C.W. 1999. Accountability of Central Banks:
Aspects and Quantification, Banca Nationale del Lavoro Quarterly Review. 209: 169-193.
De Mendon9a, Helder Ferreira, Filho, Jose Simao, Economic transparency and poverty, Banca
Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Mar 2007
Eijffinger, S., and Hoeberichts M. 2000. "Central Bank Accountability and Transparency: Theory
and Some Evidence," International Finance. 5 (1):73-96.
Fraser B. 1994. Central Bank Independence: What Does it Mean? Reserve Bank of Australia
Bulletin, December, 1994.
Government of Malawi. 2006. Office of the President and Cabinet - Achievements.
http://www.malawi.gov.mw/OPC/Achievements%20Home.htm (accessed 4 April, 2008)
Government of Malawi. 2007. Yearly Economic Review 2007. Unpublished Manuscript.
Lilongwe, Malawi
Johnson, J. 2006. Post Communist Central Banks: A Democratic Deficit? Journal ofDemocracy.
17 (1):90-103
Koch B. 2007. The Erosion of the Public-Private Divide, Challenges for Governance at Central
Banks, Conference on Non-State Actors as Standard Setters: February 8-9 2007, Hotel Hilton
Basel, Switzerland.
Lybek T. 2004. Central Bank Autonomy, Accountability, and Governance, Current Developments
in Monetary and Financial Law Seminar: May 24- June 4,2004, Washington, D.C.
Maliszewski W. 2000. 'Central Bank Independence in Transition Economies', Economies of
Transition. 8:749-789.
57
Maxifie1d S. 1998. Gatekeepers of Growth: the International Political Economy of Central
Banking in Developing Countries. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Padayachee, V. 2001. Central Bank Transformation in a Globalised World: The Reserve Bank in
Post Apartheid South Africa, Journal ofInternational Development. j.Dev. (13): 741 - 765
Parsons, R. 2005. 'Monetary Policy, Corporate Governance and The SA Reserve Bank - Should
the Bank Be Nationalised'?' Economic History Society of Southern Africa Biennial Conference,
Durban.
Quintyn M., 2007. Central Bank Governance Seminar, Role of Central Bank Boards and
Committees - Accountability of Governing Boards and Management: Gaborone, Botswana
Reserve Bank of Malawi. 2000. Exchange and Interest Rate Determination in Malawi: Past and
Present. http://www.rbm.mw/publications/documentslExchange %20and%20
Interest%20Rate%20Determination%20in%20Malawi.pdf (accessed on 30 April, 2008)
Reserve Bank of Malawi. 1989. The Reserve Bank of Malawi Act 1989.
http://www.rbm.mw/general_info/docs/RBMAct.pdf(accessed. 15 November, 2007)
Sato, J. L. 2001. Monetary Policy Frameworks in Africa: The Case of Malawi, Paper presented at
an International Conference on Monetary Policy Frameworks in Africa at the South African
Reserve Bank, Pretoria, South Africa.
Simwaka K. 2004. "The Feasibility of Adopting Inflation Targeting in Malawi: An Empirical
Analysis," Macroeconomics, EconWPA.
Sinoya L.S. 2001. The Issue of Central Bank Independence Measurement and Its Economic
Consequences in Malawi, MA Dissertation. University of Malawi
South African Reserve Bank. 2007. Establishment of the South African Reserve Bank.
www.reservebank.co.za (accessed on 4 April, 2008)
58
Stglitz, J. 1997. Central Banking in a Democratic Society - Tinbergen Lecture, 10 October, 1997,
Amsterdam, Netherlands
United Nations Development Programme. 2000. Human Development Reports.
http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_MWLhtml (accessed on 30 April, 2008)
United Nations Development Programme. 2005. Human Development Reports.
http://www.unmalawi.org/un_mal_focus_2005.html (accessed on 30 April, 2008)
59
ANNEXE 1 : CODING OF LEGAL INDEPENDENCE
Variable Number Description of variable Weight Numerical coding
1. Chief Executive Officer 0.20
a. Term of Office
Over 8 years
6 to 8 years
5 years
4 years
Under 4 years or at the discretion of appointer
b. Who appoints CEO?
Board of Central Bank
Council of Members from the Central Bank




(e.g. Council of ministers)
One or two members of the executive branch
(e.g. Prime Minister or Minister of Finance)
c. Dismissal
No provision of Dismissal
Only for reasons not related to policy
e.g. for incapacity or violation of law
At the discretion of central bank board
At legislature's discretion
Unconditional dismissal possible at
Legislature discretion
At executives discretion
d. May CEO hold other offices in Government?
No
Only with permission from the
Executive branch





















Variable Number Description of variable Weight Numerical coding
2. Policy formulation 0.15
a. Who formulates monetary policy?
Bank alone
Bank Participates with Government
Bank advises Government





b. Resolution of Conflict
Bank has the final authority on issues that are clearly
Defined in the law as its objectives 1.00
Government has priority or final word only on policy
Issues that have not been clearly defined as the bank's
Goals or in case of conflict within the bank 0.80
A council of the central bank, executive branch and
Legislative branch makes the final decision in case
of conflict 0.60
Legislature has the final word on policy issues 0.40
Executive branch has the [mal word on policy issues
Subject to due process and possible protest by the bank 0.20
Unconditional priority of executive branch in policy
Decisions 0.00
c. Role in Government Budgetary Process
Central bank active 1.00
Central bank has no influence 0.00
3. Objectives
Price stability is the major or only goal and the Central has the
Final word in favour of price stability in Case of a conflict with
other government goals 1.00
Price stability is the only goal, 0.80
Price stability is one goal with other Compatible objectives 0.60
Price stability is one goal with potentially Conflicting goals 0.40
No objectives stated in the bank charter 0.20
Stated goals do not include price stability 0.00
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Variable Number Description of variable Weight Numerical coding
4. Limitations of lending to the government 0.15
A. advances (Limitations on nonsecuritised lending)
No advances permitted
Advances permitted but with strict limits
Advances permitted and the limits are loose







Permitted but with strict limits
Permitted and the limits are loose






C. terms of lending 0.10
Controlled by the bank
Specified by the bank charter
Agreed between the central bank and executive branch
Decided by the executive branch alone
D. potential borrowers from the bank 0.05
Only the central government
All levels of government (as well as central)
Those mentioned above and public enterprises
Public and private sector
E. the limits on central bank lending are determined by
0.025
Currency amounts















F. Maturity of Loans
Within 6 months
Within 1 year
More than one year







Variable Number Description of variable
coding
Weight Numerical




Interest rate is not mentioned
No interest on government borrowing from CB
H. is the central bank prohibited from buying and selling
Government securities in the primary market
Yes
No









ANNEXE 2: QUESTIONAIRE BASED INDEX OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
(INOFRMAL MEASURE)
Variable Number Description of variable Weight Numerical
coding








Loose or nonexistent 0.00
3.
4.
Resolution of conflict 0.10
Some clear cases of resolution ofconflict in favour of bank 1.00
Resolution in favour of government in all cases 0.00
All other cases 0.50
Financial Independence 0.10
A. determination of the central banks budget
Mostly central bank 1.00
Mixture of bank and the executive or legislative branches 0.00
Mostly executive or legislative branches 0.00
B. Determination of the Salaries of high bank officials and the
Allocation of bank profits
Mostly by bank or fixed by law 1.00
Mixture ofbank and the executive or legislative branches 0.50
Mostly executive or legislative branches 0.00
5. Intermediate Policy targets 0.15
A. quantitative monetary stock target
Such targets exist and are usually met
Such targets exist: mixed adherence
No stock changes














Actual Priority given to price stability 0.15
First Priority
First Priority assigned to a fixed exchange rate
Price or exchange rate stability are among the bank's
Objectives but not first priority
No mention of price or exchange rate objectives





The central bank is heavily involved in granting
Subsidised credits










ANNEXE 3: Criteria for Accountability and Transparency
Source: Eijffinger & Hoeberichts (2000)
Objectives of Monetary Policy RBM
1. Does the central bank law stipulate 1
the objectives of monetary policy?
2. Is there a clear prioritization of 0
objectives?
3. Are the objectives clearly defined? 0
4. Are the objectives quantified (in the 0
law or based on document based on the
law)?
Subtotal on ultimate objectives 1
of monetary policy
5. Must the central bank publish an 1
inflation or monetary
policy report of some kind, in addition
to standard central bank
bulletins/report?
6. Are minutes of meetings of the I
governing board of the central bank
made public within a reasonable time?
7. Must the central bank explain 0
publicly to which extent it has been able
to reach its objectives?
Subtotal on transparency 2
8. is the central bank subject to 1
monitoring by Parliament
(is there a requirement - apart from an
annual report - to
report to Parliament and/or explain
policy actions in
Parliament)?
9. Has the government the right to give 0
instructions?
10. Is there some kind of review in the 0
procedure to apply the override
mechanism?
11. Has the central bank has possibility 0
for an appeal in case of an instruction?
12. Can the central bank law be 0
changed by a simple majority in
Parliament?
13. is past performance a ground for 0
dismissal of a central bank governor?
Subtotal on final responsibility 1
Total on accountability 4
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